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Introduction 
 
Mifid II is a legislative packaged, made up of the Directive 2014/65/EU and the Regulation 
600/2014, which has been recently introduced by the European Union. In Italy, the Legislative 
Decree of August 3rd, 2017, was published on the Official Journal on August 25th, 2017, that 
includes the implementing rules of the Directive 2014/65/UE. The transposition of this directive 
affects significantly the Legislative Decree n. 58/1998 named TUF 1 . MiFID II has been 
implemented with the aim at reaching a deeper integration of financial market in the EU area 
and ameliorate the investor protection as well as recover clients’ confidence after the global 
financial crisis. It has replaced the existing Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID 
I) from 3rd of January 2018 and it represents a prominent upgrade of the old directive. 
MiFID I (Directive 2004/39/EC)2 becomes effective in November 2007 and the main objectives 
of it were to increase the transparency across the European Union’s financial market, harmonise 
regulation for investment services and in general the legal frameworks for wholesale and retail 
market, increase competition and consumer protection in investment services and improve the 
competitiveness of EU financial markets by creating a unique European financial market for 
activities, investments and services. 
Even if the former Directive had improved the financial framework and was useful mainly to 
remove the barriers in Europe, the financial crisis that occurred in 2008 underlined the 
weaknesses of this directive, in particular in the field of retail investor protection and market 
transparency because the rules haven’t been applied in a consistent way, leaving MiFID I old-
fashioned and inefficient. 
As a consequence of this, the Regulator claimed to do a review of MiFID I in 2010 in order to 
ensure a more robust legislative framework that was necessary to address the more complex 
market system we are now faced with, the instable historic period which is depicted by the 
increasing diversity and complexity of financial products, new methods of trading and a fast 
development of technology. 
Like all the set of laws that has been implemented after a period harmed by financial crisis, 
similarly the new MiFID package aimed to stabilize financial markets, and in general it is 
designed in order to provide greater protection for investors and improve asset classes’ 
                                                          
1 De Poli M. “MiFID II e decreto legislativo di recepimento n. 129/2017. L’apparato sanzionatorio e la reazione 
a condotte antigiuridiche”, 2017.  
2 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Markets in Financial Instruments, 
Official Journal of the European Union, 30 April 2004. 
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transparency. After a long period needed for the enforcement of the modified directive, MiFID 
II came into force on 3rd January 2018. This renewed rulebook provided changes for all market 
participants, investment firms, banks and clients, basing the innovations in particular on two 
pillars: market transparency and investor protection. The main purpose in fact was to improve 
financial stability and consumer confidence. 
The retail client protection is a fulcrum in the updated Market in Financial Instrument Directive; 
it has firstly attempted to recover the investor confidence lost during the crisis that appear to be 
the starting point of the new rulebook. 
In general, the integration improvement of European financial markets is pursued following 
several streams like increasing competition, improving efficiency and investor protection, 
expanding the supervision’s competencies of authorities. 
One of the most relevant innovation, for the purpose of reaching all the previous goals, in 
particular the transparency improvement and the increase of investor protection, is represented 
by the product governance regime. Through this new set of rules, the Regulator has decided to 
intervene at the root of the production process of financial instruments, namely the design and 
creation phase.  
The correct functioning of these provisions should guarantee a market stability and integrity. 
Hence, after an overview of MiFID I and the legislative path towards the new regime 
implemented through the MiFID II package, will be explained the legal steps and tools 
introduced by the Regulator for the purpose of reaching the highest level of investor protection. 
In this context, will be analysed in detail all the features and rules embedded in the product 
governance regime. 
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Chapter One 
 
MiFID I and MiFID II 
 
The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID I), is one of the most relevant set of 
law in the European Union concerning financial markets, companies and banks. The market in 
financial instrument directive (Directive 2004/39/CE)3, was first implemented in 2007 and was 
intended to replace the Investment Services Directive (ISD)4, which came into force in 1993. 
MiFID I attempted to create a competitive environment for the provision of investment services 
and an harmonised basket of rules across Europe in relation with a general liberalisation of 
investment services and a higher degree of investor protection. In a more detailed manner, the 
Regulator tried to renew the discipline regarding markets, investors and investment firms.5 
 
 
1.1  Structure of MiFID I 
The peculiarity of this legislative regime concerns the fact that it was not defined as one single 
directive, but it was a resulted document implemented at various levels step by step following 
the named “Lamfalussy procedure”6. 
 
I. First level is represented by the Directive 2004/39/CE and defines general principles of 
the ruleset; 
II. Second level is represented by the Regulation 1287/2006/CE 7 , that regards the 
discipline of markets, the pre- and post-trade transparency rules, and by the Directive 
2006/73/CE8 that disciplines the role of the intermediary that offer investment services; 
                                                          
3 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial 
instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC. 
4 Council Directive 93/22/EEC of May 1993 on investment services in the securities field. 
5 Capriglione F. “Preliminary considerations on the MiFID II Directive (between investors’ expectations and 
actual legal framework)”, in Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto dell’Economia, February 2015. 
6 “The Lamfalussy architecture”, European Commission. 
7  Commission Regulation (EC) n°1287/2006 of 10 August 2006 implementing Directive 2004/39/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council as regards recordkeeping obligations for investment firms, transaction 
reporting, market transparency, admission of financial instruments to trading, and defined terms for the purposes 
of that Directive. 
8 Commission Directive 2006/73/EC of 10 August 2006 implementing Directive 2004/39/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council as regards organisational requirements and operating conditions for investment 
firms and defined terms for the purposes of that Directive.  
 
 
4 
 
III. Third level corresponds to the guidelines of Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (CESR) and was implemented in order to manage, receipt and apply at 
national level all the regulatory acts defined in the previous levels. 
IV. The Fourth level process is the on-going review and enforcement by the European 
Commission. 
 
 
1.2  Innovations of MiFID I and Purpose 
In general, the Directive 2004/39/CE has been designed in order to reach harmonization in the 
legal framework for retail and wholesale market, improve the competitiveness of European 
financial market by creating a single market, augment stability and reach a higher degree of 
investor protection. More in details, the Regulator sought to insert, modify and ameliorate a lot 
of disparate fields considering this revision as the starting point necessary to achieve the 
aforementioned goals. 
A brief bullet list is explained below: 
 
 Authorisation, regulation and passporting: 
The passporting arrangement was introduced in order to allow MiFID firms to provide services 
in all European Member States9. It is an important pillar in the functioning of global financial 
market and states that firms are regulated firstly by their home country but then can operate in 
other EU host states; 
 
 Client order handling: 
This phase regards the collection of information that are fundamental for the firm in order to 
act in the client’s best interest, in a favourable and profitable way10; 
 
 Client categorisation: 
It is based on three classes of clients: eligible counterparties, professional clients and retail 
clients. The firms have to collect all the available information to classify clients and then they 
have to decide what products or services could have a possible match with these different types 
of clients. The client categorisation is a relevant part in the legislative regime because is linked 
                                                          
9 Kemp R., “MiFID (the markets in financial instrument directive) and technology”, in Computer Law & Security 
Report 24, Volume 4, Issue 2, pp. 151-162, 2008. 
10 Sepe M., “La nuova regolazione dei mercati finanziari”, 2016. 
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with the protection level of the investor, in fact the degree of protection is established basing 
on the aforementioned classification.  
In this way, a better knowledge and experience the investor will have, the lower the level of 
protection will be. 
 
 Pre- and post-trade transparency rules: 
The set of rules managing transparency issues plays a central role in the Directive. The 
European Regulator, through the extending process of these rules, has intended to enhance 
liquidity and improve the investor protection. Besides they are useful to support venues’ trading 
mechanism, disclosure market data seeking to monitor and avoid systemic risks11. 
 
 Inducements and conflict of interest rules: 
The organisation requirements sector of MiFID provides rules aimed at avoiding any possible 
conflict of interest between firms and clients’ interests; furthermore, the investment firms 
should reveal commission, fees and non-monetary benefits that are not directly linked with the 
investment service or that aren’t useful to improve the quality of the services provided. 
 
 Best execution: 
This provision obliges firm to consider all steps and information needed to obtain the best 
possible result in accordance with the client’s best interest ensuring a higher degree of investor 
protection. This is applied for execution of orders on behalf of clients, reception and 
transmission of order and portfolio management service. 
 
 Systematic internalization12: 
It is linked with the elimination of the concentration rule13 (art 14 (3) of the 1993 Investment 
Service Directive ISD)14; with the cancellation of concentration rule, trades may be executed 
in alternative trading systems different from the main and regulated market15. 
 
                                                          
11 “MiFID 2.0: Casting New Light on Europe’s Capital Markets”, Pierre Francotte, Diego Valiante and Karel 
Lanno. 
12  Anolli M., Petrella G., “Internalization in European equity market following the adoption of the EU MiFID 
Directive”, in Journal of Trading, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 77-88, 12 April 2007. 
13 The rule in art. 14 (3) of the 1993 ISD disciplined that each member countries had the right to concentrate all 
orders on a regulated market. 
14 Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities filed. 
15 Davis R., Dufour A., Scott-Quin B., “The MiFID: competition in a new European equity market regulatory 
structure”, 14 July 2005. 
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Purpose 
Despite all the innovations provided by the Market in Financial Instrument Directive, we can 
declare that there are three main themes managed by MiFID I that are investor protection, 
market access and transparency. 
In particular as regards the investor protection, the Directive established a new set of procedures 
for the firms with the purpose of conducting their business in a sound manner as well as 
removing the conflicts of interests16. This assures that investors receive an adequate set of 
information about firm’s execution practices and that operates in the best interest of clients as 
well as the introduction of trading rules (order handling, trade reporting rules, order 
execution)17. 
Talking about market access instead, MiFID I through the application of the “passport” allowed 
firms to provide services in the other Member States and to have access to regulated market in 
the host country18. 
Transparency means a series of provisions that regulates pre- and post-trade transparency 
obligations19. 
The aim of the harmonization and homogenization of the market had been predetermined for 
the purpose of improving confidence in cross border trade and competition, increasing the 
investor protection and reducing the inefficiency. 
In 2008 the global Financial crisis occurred and stressed weaknesses and flaws of the old 
rulebook; the effort of the directive to protect investors resulted not applied in a consistent and 
efficient way. The financial troubles left the Directive suddenly inefficient and old fashioned 
due to the quick transformation of the markets and the overall financial system. 
As a consequence of this, the Regulator, with the aim to solve the flaws of the directive, has 
decided to make some adjustments of MiFID I in 2010. The resulting review was composed by 
two new pieces of legislation: MiFID II, a new Directive and MiFIR20, a Regulation. These 
texts became law in 2014 and were introduced in January 2018. The package of reviewed rules 
was designed to enhance the efficiency, resiliency and integrity of financial market; it also 
aimed at redefining market infrastructure and improving market transparency. Forming a 
                                                          
16 Art. 13, 18, 19 of Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Markets in Financial 
Instruments, Official Journal of the European Union, 30 April 2004. 
17 Art. 21, 22, 25 of Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Markets in Financial 
Instruments, Official Journal of the European Union, 30 April 2004. 
18 Art. 31 of Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Markets in Financial 
Instruments, Official Journal of the European Union, 30 April 2004. 
19 Art. 27, 28, 29, 30, 44 of Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Markets in 
Financial Instruments, Official Journal of the European Union, 30 April 2004. 
20 Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in 
financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. 
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comprehensive revamping of the existing directive, MiFID II and MiFIR enlarge the field of 
application and at the same time seek to cover the “dark holes” left by the old Directive. On the 
top of the hierarchical pyramid’s innovations remains again the effort to strengthen the 
protection of investors, probably the cornerstone of the new legislative package. 
 
 
1.3  Evolution of the Discipline: from MiFID I to MiFID II 
As I have reported before, the Directive 2004/39/UE (MiFID I), has provided the regulatory 
framework regarding principally the investor protection and the supply of financial products 
and investment activities by investment firms. 
The main objectives that were pursued by the introduction of MiFID I could be summarized in: 
 
 the attempt to improve efficiency, competitiveness and integration of European 
financial markets through the creation of a unique market for investment activities and 
services; 
 a higher level of investor protection, an extended regulation of transparency and safety 
of the market through an increased set of rules addressed intermediaries21; 
 an increase in competition within the European Union in term of activities and 
investment services. 
 
MiIFID II aimed at innovating and integrating the previous Directive, without modifies the 
cornerstone, and increasing the restrictions and behavioural rules of intermediaries. 
One of the most important change in the new Directive turns around the position of the client. 
Now the client covers a central role in the new legislative package; a solid investor protection 
becomes fundamental in the economic environment in order to ensure stability in the financial 
market. In this way, the new rules require that the investor protection process starts in the very 
early stage in the financial instrument production. This can be achieved only increasing the 
rigidity of the financial institutions’ internal rules. 
The introduction of MiFID II was characterized with a step by step implementation procedure 
that passes through a huge number of consultations, revisions and corrections of the original 
text. 
 
                                                          
21 Davies J. R., “MiFID and a changing competitive landscape”, July 2008. 
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Brief roadmap towards the introduction of MiFID II22: 
 In December 8th, 2010 the European Commission launched a consultation to review 
MiFID I. 
 
 In October 20th, 2011 the European Commission made official the new MiFID II 
(Market in Financial Instruments Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council) defining it as a part of revision of the previous Directive as well as a 
part of the new Regulation entitled MiFIR (Regulation N. 600/2014 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council). 
 
 Between April and July 2014, the European institutions adopted in a formal level the 
new Directive MiFID II; more precisely on April 15th, the Council adopted the final 
texts for the two documents while in July they were published in the Official Journal 
entering into force. 
 
 In September 28th, 2015, ESMA23 proposed the transformation of laws in functioning 
technical standards (Regulatory Technical Standard, Implementing Technical Standard, 
Technical Advice). ESMA moreover has published Guidelines that are subject to a 
periodically upgrade. 
 
 In October, 2015, ESMA declared to the European Commission that it wasn’t able to 
introduce the Directive in January 201724. 
 
 In February, 2016, the European Union decided to officially postpone the introduction 
of MiFID II for a year. 
 
                                                          
22 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial 
instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU. 
23 On November, 1st, 2011, became effective and operative some supervisory European authorities, i.e. EBA for 
the banking sector, ESMA for markets and financial product and EIOPA for the pension and insurance system; in 
a strict relationship with them there is ESRB that manages the micro-prudential supervision. Furthermore, all 
supervision authorities, national and supranational are linked through a network called European System of 
Financial Supervision (ESFS) useful to maintain stability of financial system, create confidence and assure a high 
level of investor protection. Pellegrini M. “MiFID II e complesso autoritativo di vigilanza europea. In particolare 
l’ESMA”. 
24 Sesti G. “Going further on investors’ protection: product governance, product intervention and the role of 
ESMA”, In Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto dell’Economia, January 2016. 
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 In January, 3rd, 2018, MiFID II and MiFIR were applied for all member states of the 
European Union. 
 
The MiFID II Directive and the MiFIR Regulation together with the related delegated acts and 
guidelines compose a legislative package that is commonly referred to as “MiFID II”. 
 
 
1.4  MiFID II Revolution 
The recent Global Financial Crisis related to subprime mortgages and Alt-A loans 25 
undermined market stability and affected negatively the investors’ confidence26 as well as the 
takedown of the whole financial system27. Several other factors like technological changes, 
development of markets, implementation of new trading platforms and activities which fall 
outside the aim of  MiFID I, have played a central role in the need of restructuring of the 
previous directive. All these players, together with the instable financial situation, led to a 
necessary overhaul of the legal framework governing financial markets. Closing such holes was 
essential in order to attempt to reach all the MiFID’s original goals. 
For this reason, mainly, European authorities have decided to review and extend the aim of 
Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID I) few years later after the creation. This new 
rulebook, composed by a Directive, the MiFID II and by a Regulation, the MiFIR, has been 
introduced in order to correct the weaknesses and the limits highlighted by the crisis, to reduce 
the typical information asymmetries of the market and to reach a deeper integration of European 
financial markets. 
The Regulator aimed at reaching a sounder, safer, fairer, more stable and more efficient 
financial market strictly linked with an improvement in the investors’ confidence and 
protection. In general, the main goal pursued by the authorities was to create a unique European 
financial market, in particular ensuring a more transparent market and a higher degree of 
investor protection. 
The acknowledged of MiFID II in the national law systems and the entry into force outline an 
evolution of the previous discipline around the European market. MiFID II covers a relevant 
position in the legal framework because, on one hand it has corrected the holes in the old 
directive but maintaining the previous fundamentals, on the other hand has introduced 
important innovations that probably will characterize all the future financial system. 
                                                          
25 Alt-A are loans that are considered riskier than prime loans but less risky than subprime loan. 
26 Wallison J. P., Burns F. A., “Financial crisis inquiry commission”, January 2011. 
27 Akinbami F., “Retail financial products and the global financial crisis”, 20 June 2012. 
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In January 3rd, 2018, the New Directive MiFID II came into force regulating financial markets 
in 31 countries in the European Economic Area, (more precisely 28 countries of the European 
Union plus Island, Liechtenstein and Norway) and it was addressed to all financial firms like 
banks providing investment services, asset management companies, brokerage companies, 
security firms, regulated market operators and energy and commodity players. 
An important issue to take into consideration is that the Directive is supported by a detailed 
Regulation called MiFIR, a set of technical standards issued by ESMA and European 
regulations28 (in details with the implementation of forty-five Delegated Acts29). 
In this way we talk about MiFID II like a complex “package” because it is articulated in several 
levels; this approach is essential for a correct interpretation and application in order to analyse 
the Directive together with other legal texts. 
Among these, the most important are the EMIR30, the PRIIPs regulation and the Insurance 
Distribution Directive (IDD) 31 ; obviously there are other interconnections with other 
disciplines but less relevant. For this reason, the legal package comprehends a vertical side, due 
to different degrees of articulation, and a horizontal side because of the interactions with 
different legal frameworks that are at the same time intensely linked. 
The MiFID II Directive is articulated in levels and its structure is very similar in comparison 
with the structure of the old directive. The legislative process for the new directive involves 
four stages: 
 
I. First Level: MiFID II and MiFIR compose the first level which is the framework of 
legislation. The MiFID II side includes requirements for investment services, investment 
firms, trading venues, third-country firms, competent authorities’ powers and obligations 
for providers of data services. On the side of MiFIR there are provisions about trade 
transparency, mandatory trading rules of derivatives and specific provision on 
supervisory actions in financial instruments. 
 
                                                          
28Annunziata F. “Il recepimento di MiFID II: uno sguardo di insieme, tra continuità e discontinuità.”, in Rivista 
delle Società, April 2018. 
29 Legal reference to Delegated acts which are listed in ESMA website https://www.esma.europa.eu. 
30 EMIR is the acronym of European Market Infrastructure Regulation. In March, 29th, 2012 it entered into force 
after the European Parliament had adopted the final version of EMIR; it seeks to improve transparency in 
derivatives markets and wants to reduce systemic risk. As a result of this agreement all standardised OTC 
derivatives contract must be cleared through central counterparties. It in complex represents a monumental change 
in the regulation of the over-the-counter derivatives market. 
Morton J. “MiFID II. Getting ready for January 2018.”, Bloomberg. 
31 Directive (EU) 2016/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 January 2016 on insurance 
distribution. 
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II. Second Level: this level was developed between 2014 and 2016; it was composed by 
Commission Delegated acts, Commission Implementing Regulations, Commission 
Delegated Regulations and ESMA’s Guidelines. In particular, the Consultation Paper of 
ESMA defines propositions for its technical advice to the Commission on the proposed 
delegated acts for the purpose of modify the MiFID Implementing Directive. Therefore, 
the Consultation Paper regards several investor protection provisions in MiFID II. 
After that, ESMA has published in 2014 some Technical Advice and then are published 
the MiFID II Delegated Regulation, the MiFID II Delegated Directive and the MiFIR 
Delegated Regulation. 
This last one Delegated Regulation has direct effect while Delegated Directives have to 
transpose into national jurisdiction by each country. As regards to Technical Standards 
instead, the ESMA Discussion Paper shifts the attention on innovations like market 
structure, transparency and data reporting; then ESMA has published final draft of 
Technical Standards in the second half of 2015. Technical Standards are divided into two 
classes: regulatory technical standards (RTS) and implementing technical standards 
(ITS); the Commissions has decided to adopt them in 2016. 
 
III. Third Level: it consists of recommendations, consultations and Guidelines published by 
ESMA including important topics like: 
 
 Debt instruments and structured products 
 Valuation of the investment advisor’s skills and competences 
 Transaction reporting 
 Product governance 
 Investor protection 
 
IV. Fourth Level: this level is characterized by the supervision and the execution of 
requirements that Member States must comply. 
 
 
1.5  Weaknesses and Flaws of MiFID I 
Coming back to the past, MiFID I certainly had improved the financial systems’ situation 
providing important innovations, but the crisis burst in 2008 undermined the Directive making 
it immediately outdated and inefficient afterward. 
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The progressively deterioration of the financial system uncovered a lot of weaknesses linked to 
important fields of MiFID which represented the cornerstone of the legislative framework. The 
most relevant issues are: 
 
 The risk profile of the client, one of the most important pillar of the Directive, was 
replaced with a questionnaire that was often filled in a shallow manner without 
comply with the central aim of this process. 
 The problem of conflict of interests has harmed a huge number of financial 
activities; MiFID II aims at providing not only with a better management of this 
problem but seeking to avoid them completely. 
 The asymmetric information problem, that represents an already intrinsic peculiarity 
of each investment activities, was exacerbated by dishonest behaviours of 
intermediaries who supplied financial instruments barely understandable. 
 In some case intermediaries, pushed from internal budgeting goals, have provided 
internal financial instruments to client of whom risk profile was not appropriate for 
the products’ peculiarities. In order to deal with this problem, MiFID II requires to 
intermediaries a high degree of competences and skills32. 
 
 
1.6  MiFID II Changes 
MiFID II maintains the original general bipartition of the previous directive such that, on one 
hand it concerns all the discipline about trading venues, on the other hand about investment 
services but analysing it in a deeper manner and providing more granular rules. 
MiFID II has introduced innovations and modification, aimed at establishing a sounder, more 
transparent and safer financial system, that could be summarized in six main streams of 
application: 
 
 Market structure framework  
 enhanced governance of trading venues  
 introduction of OTF 
 
 Transparency and transaction reporting  
                                                          
32Bertelli R. “Perché MiFID non ha funzionato”, Antonio Criscione, in Il sole 24 ore-PLUS24, bancadati24, 
Dicembre 2017. 
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 Improved pre- and post-trade transparency  
 Greater consolidation of market data (APA, CTP, ARM) 
 More extensive transaction reporting  
 Enhanced regulation of Algo-Trading and High Frequency Trading 
 Equity market transparency 
 
 Supervision 
 Harmonised powers and conditions for ESMA 
 Product intervention  
 Harmonisation of administrative sanctions 
 
 Commodity Derivatives 
 More intensive regulation of commodity derivatives  
 
 Non-EU Investment Firms 
 New framework for third-country firms to access EU market  
 
 Investor protection  
 Organisational requirements 
 Product governance  
 PRIIPs Regulation 
 Business conduct 
 New rules about IMD (Insurance Mediation Directive)  
 Conflict of interest and Inducements  
 Strengthen requirements of suitability and appropriateness 
 Independent advisory services’ rules 
 Improve staff’s competencies 
 
Market Structure Framework 
Way back in 2007, when MiFID I was introduced, the market structure was classified through 
a binary model; on one side there were the regulated trading venues category composed by 
Regulated Market (RM) and Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTF), on the other side there were 
the Over-the-Counter (OTC) bilateral trades. The fulcrum of this grouping was based on the 
different mandatory transparency rules. 
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The recent crisis persuaded the Regulator to renew the market structure through a more critical 
point of view focusing the revision on a deeper regulatory framework33. Approximately ten 
years later the launch of MiFID I came afloat the limits of the old directive probably due to the 
creation of new hybrid trading system like broking crossing network34, the opportunity to trade 
on non-regulated market, the ongoing technology revolution with the introduction of new 
trading system based on algorithm (i.e Algo-Trading and High Frequency Trading)35.  
The innovations introduced by Directive 2014/65/UE and Regulation 600/2014/UE in the 
stream of market structure are certainly worthy of note. The main purpose of the new legislation 
package was to promote and support the execution of negotiation within regulated trading 
systems among regulated market (RM), Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTF) and Organized 
Trading Facilities (OTF)36. This structural change was firstly necessary related to the ongoing 
progress of technology and secondly, the Regulator has sought to improve the competition 
supporting the access to regulated facilities. 
OTF, introduced by MiFID II, are multilateral system in which multiple third-parties can buy 
or sell structured finance products, interests in bonds, emission allowances and derivatives 
(only non-equity instruments). The structure of the definition is deliberately wide37 in order to 
gather all the negotiation that are not in compliance with the restrictions requested for a 
regulated market or for a MTF; only an exception is contemplated and concerns ad hoc bilateral 
trading parties which are not located on organised venues. This peculiarity has allowed to 
reduce the unregulated transactions improving the transparency’s relationship between trading 
venues and market38. All the features concerning OTF are disciplined in the provisions of Title 
II of the MiFID II Directive and this new trading venue is classified as an investment service. 
There are some important peculiarities that represents distinctive elements of investment firms 
operating OTF; they can firstly act with discretion in the phase of place and retract order and in 
                                                          
33 Moloney N., “MiFID II: Reshaping the Perimeter of EU Trading Market Regulation”, 6 Law & Fin. Mkt. Rev. 
327, 2012. 
34 Broking Crossing Network are internal system in banks or investment firms through which are matched buying 
and selling orders of financial instruments with the use of electronic system. They are characterized by a very high 
degree of automatism in the execution process which assures impartiality and neutrality. For a deeper analysis see 
Annunziata F., “Il fenomeno “ibrido” dei crossing system: una valutazione alla luce dell’attuale normative e 
nell’ottica della riforma MiFID II”, Maggio 2014. 
35 Di Nella L., “Features of the New Financial Markets Law (MIFID 2 AND MIFIR)”,15 in Revista Brasileira 
Direito Civil 119, 2018. 
36 For a deeper analysis of trading options post MiFID II and MiFIR see the tab below from “MiFID 2.0: Casting 
New Light on Europe’s Capital Markets”, Pierre Francotte, Diego Valiante and Karel Lannoo, 
 report of the ECMI-CEPS task force on the MiFID review. 
37 Parziale A., “La proposta di riforma MiFID II ed il suo impatto sulla disciplina delle trading venues”, in “Crisi 
dei mercati finanziari e corporate governance: poteri dei soci e tutela del risparmio a cura di Lener R., in i Saggi 
di Minerva Bancaria, pp. 331-366. 
38  Bertis De Marinis G., “Regolamentazione del mercato finanziario e principio di trasparenza”, in 
Responsabilita' Civile e Previdenza, fasc.3, p. 0991B, 2016. 
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the matching phase, secondly the financial institutions have to need a permission to operate an 
OTF and thirdly, one of the most relevant peculiarity, concerns the limit number of asset classes 
that can be negotiated on an Organised Trading Facilities (in fact, should be noted that on a 
OTF is denied the trading of shares and similar products)39. In order to ensure a sounder and 
genuine trading system, the legislator has introduced more stringent measure of trade 
transparency obligations and access requirements as well as the commitment with respect to the 
investor protection provisions explained in article 24 (information to client), article 25 
(suitability rule), article 27 (best execution), article 28 (order handling) of MiFID II. It is 
necessary to highlight that all obligations about transparency and surveillance rules, typical of 
MTF and regulated market, are also applied to OTF. The main goal the Regulator wants to 
reach through the introduction of OTF is to limit as much as possible the over-the-counter 
transactions (scholars are estimated that around 38% of total trading belongs to “dark” 
trading)40. 
Other than the introduction of the new type of trading facility, some other rules must be kept 
into consideration for a detailed analysis of the widen structural change concerning the market 
structure. Systematic Internaliser (SI) are not considered trading venues anymore41; it is a 
counterparty that on an organised, frequent, systematic and substantial basis deals on own 
account which operates a bilateral system and can’t bring together third-party orders42. 
The other relevant rules introduced for the purpose of ameliorating the breach of the old 
directive will be illustrated in the subsequent paragraphs. 
                                                          
39 Marin F., “MiFID regulation of trading venues as a step forward in the path towards the Capital Markets 
Union”, Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto dell’Economia, Gennaio 2018. 
40 Moloney N., “MiFID II: Reshaping the Perimeter of EU Trading Market Regulation”, 6 Law & Fin. Mkt. Rev. 
327, 2012. 
41 For a deeper analysis see Ghielmi C., “Le sedi di negoziazione nell’ambito della disciplina MiFID II e MiFIR”, 
in Rivista di Diritto Bancario, Aprile 2015 
42 Art. 4 (1), Recital 20 of  Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
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Transparency and transaction reporting 
The growing fragmentation of the markets and the increasingly massive diffusion of over-the-
counter operations persuaded the European Commission to renew the legislative framework 
regarding the transparency regime and the transaction reporting obligations.43 
The revamping of the Markets in Financial Instrument Directive disciplines important changes 
in order to reduce the opaqueness of trades; the concept of transparency assumes two different 
meaning referred to the relationship intermediary/client on one hand and trading venues/market 
on the other. These issues however are both linked to the investor protection area that remains 
the cornerstone of the new discipline. In this paragraph, the attention will be focused on the 
second sense of the concept44. Initially, in relation to MiFID I Directive, the transparency 
requirements concerned only shares tradable on regulated markets; as a consequence of this, 
the new directive aimed at improving the transparency regimes for both equity-like and non-
equity financial instruments, which are exchanged on MTF and OTF on one side, and on the 
over-the-counter transactions on the other side. 
In fact, in an open and competitive financial market, the need to implement a deeper regulation 
about transparency regime is out of the question if the main goal is a better investor protection; 
                                                          
43 Bernard C. “MiFID II: The New Transparency Regime”, March 2014. 
44 Bertis De Marinis G. “Regolamentazione del mercato finanziario e principio di trasparenza”, in Responsabilità 
Civile e Previdenza, fasc.3, p. 0991B, 2016. 
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in other words, to obtain a correct price discovery process and a sounder trading system is 
necessary a strong transparency regime. 
The previous directive had attempted to improve the safety of the market in the field of 
transparency but leaving aside a detailed regulation of OTC transactions directly correlated with 
the well-known derivatives contract on subprime mortgages. In addition, a series of legislative 
holes in the regulation, among which the most relevant concerned “dark pool”, broking crossing 
system, some important limits in the application of rule (only to share so far) and a weak data 
system reporting, had harmed the price discovery system and hampered the market equilibrium. 
The new regulation, in particular, disciplines pre-trade transparency rules for equity, equity-
like instruments (more precisely shares, depositary receipts, ETFs, certificates and other similar 
financial instruments) and non-equity instruments (bonds, Structured finance products, 
emission allowances and derivatives) respectively in article 3 and article 6 of MiFIR stating 
that market operators “shall make public current bid and offer prices and the depth of trading 
interests at those prices which are advertised through their system”45. 
A very similar structure is provided by MiFIR to define post-trade transparency obligations in 
article 8 and article 10 stating that “market operators and investment firms operating a trading 
venue shall make public the price, volume and time of the transactions executed” respectively 
for equity and non-equity instruments. 46 
Following this structure, the Regulator has attempted to align the rules involving equity and 
non-equity instruments introducing only some distinction in term of transparency obligations 
basing on the different trading system employed by investment firms (order-driven or quote-
driven). 
After a preliminary implementation of a strong transparency regime, the other fundamental step 
in order to reach a higher level of information to client is obviously an efficient spread system 
of information47. MiFIR disciplines transaction reporting obligations in article 12 and article 13 
in chapter 3 stating that trading venues must provide pre- and post-trade information separately 
to the public in a manner that it is on a reasonable commercial basis, with a non-discriminatory 
access and free of charge 15 minutes after publication.  
                                                          
45 Art. 3 and Art. 6 regarding pre-trade transparency obligations of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) 
No 648/2012, 12/6/2014, Official journal of the European Union. 
46 Art. 8 and Art. 10 regarding post-trade transparency obligations of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending 
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, 12/6/2014, Official journal of the European Union. 
47 Bertis de Marinis G. “La nuova trasparenza PRE e POST negoziale alla luce della direttiva MiFID e del 
regolamento MiFIR”, in “La MiFID II, rapporti con la clientela, regole di governance, mercati”, pp. 287-311, a 
cura di Troiano V., Motroni R. 
 
 
18 
 
Therefore, investment firms, in according with the new legislative framework48 concerning data 
reporting services, that conclude transactions shall make public some information through an 
APA (Approved Publication Arrangement), ARM (Approved Reporting Mechanism) and CTP 
(Consolidated Tape Provider). 
 
 APA are market operators entitled to publish report of concluded transactions on behalf 
of investment firms pursuant to article 20 and article 21 of Regulation (EU) No. 
600/2014 and about equity, equity-like and non-equity instruments; 
 ARM are market operators entitled to report details of concluded transactions to 
competent authorities and ESMA on behalf of investment firms; 
 CTP are market operators entitled to provide the service of gathering trade reports for 
specific financial instruments (listed in articles 6, 7, 10, 12, 12, 20 and 21 of Regulation 
(EU) No. 600/2014) from Regulated Markets, MTF, OTF and APA and combining them 
into an uninterrupted electronic live data stream to ESMA and competent authorities on 
behalf of investment firms49. 
 
In this way, the overhaul legislative framework regarding transparency regime could play a 
central role in the creation of a safer financial market. 
As a result of the telematic and informatic technologic progress, in the last two decades, there 
was the creation of new trading systems and techniques named Algo-Trading and High 
Frequency Trading threatening the market’s stability50; scholars consider HFT responsible for 
idiosyncratic shock51, volatility of financial instruments, price manipulation and liquidity and 
transparency problems52.  
The growth of this alternatives techniques is increasing constantly and in particular, estimated 
data of recent studies (P. Gomber, B. Arndt, T. Uhle 2011) have demonstrated that in Europe 
the exchanges based on HFT fluctuate between 19 and 40% with respect to the total flow of 
                                                          
48 Art. 4 (1), p. 52, 53,54 of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 
on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU, 12/06/2014, 
Official Journal of the European Union. 
49 Scacchi F., Zaghini G. “MiFID II. I servizi di comunicazione dati: APA, ARM, CTP”, in Rivista di Diritto 
Bancario, Settembre 2015. 
50 Cialella G., “Describing and regulating high-frequency trading: a European perspective”, in “The Handbook 
of High Frequency Trading”, pp. 95-110, a cura di Gregoriou G., 2015.  
51 Idiosyncratic risk, also referred to as unsystematic risk, is the risk that is endemic to a particular asset such as a 
stock and not a whole investment portfolio. Being the opposite of systematic risk (the overall risk that affects all 
assets, like fluctuations in the stock market or interest rates), Idiosyncratic risk can be mitigated 
through diversification in an investment portfolio. 
52 Mezzacapo S. “La regolamentazione dell’Algorithmic trading nell’UE”, in “La MiFID II, rapporti con la 
clientela, regole di governance, mercati”, pp. 341-379, a cura di Troiano V., Motroni R. 
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trades, while in USA between 40 and 70%53. The Regulator has decided to introduce some 
systemic and operation requirements54 that discipline HFT on MiFID II55 so as to guarantee a 
correct functioning of the market; any firms that exploit Algo-trading techniques indeed, must 
have in place an effective system and risk controls appropriated. Even in this field, the new 
legislative packaged and the correlated new obligations about HFT, are introduced for the 
purpose of protecting the investor confidence. 
 
Supervision 
The ongoing evolution of European banking supervision originates from the subprime 
mortgages disaster in 2007 and the following Lehman Brothers default in 2008 digging up the 
weakness of the harmonized banking supervision56. Among the most relevant intervention there 
was the creation of ESFS5758 composed by EBA59, ESMA60, EIOPA61 and ESRB62. 
The strengthening of the supervision system led to a deeper and wider control of the correct 
functioning of the market by supervisory authorities that was supplemented with a recent 
regulation known as product intervention. The term “Product Intervention”, introduced by 
Regulation n. 600/201463, is referred to the supervision power of the financial product split 
between national (NCAs) and supranational authorities (ESMA and EBA). They are entitled to 
limit or deny the diffusion, marketing and sale of potentially harmful financial products or 
structured deposits64 that could have negative effect on the stability and integrity of the market 
                                                          
53Alvaro S., Ventoruzzo M., ““High-frequency trading”: note per una discussione”, in Banca Impresa Società/a. 
xxxv, n. 3, 2016. 
54 Leonard C., Zahabi E., Poon C., “Common market, common rulebook?”, 34 Int'l Fin. L. Rev. 32, 2015.   
55 Recital 59,60 of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
56 Montedoro G., “Poteri di intervento delle autorità europee e giustiziabilità”, in “La MiFID II, rapporti con la 
clientela, regole di governance, mercati”, pp. 387-395, a cura di Troiano V., Motroni R. 
57 European System of Financial Supervisions (ESFS) is the framework for financial supervision in European 
Union created in 2011. 
58 Regulation (EU) n. 1092/2010, n. 1093/2010, n. 1094/2010, n. 1095/2010. 
59 European Banking Authority (EBA) is responsible for the supervision of banking system since 2011 created by 
Regulation (EU) n. 1093/2010. 
60 European Securities and Markets Authorities (ESMA) is responsible for the supervision of European financial 
market since 2011 created by the Regulation n. 1095/2010. 
61  European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) is responsible for the supervision of 
European assurance market and occupational pension schemes since 2011 created by the Regulation n. 1094/2010. 
62 European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) is responsible for macro-prudential control in order to prevent or 
mitigate systemic risk to financial stability in the EU since 2010. 
63 These obligations are disciplined in Regulation n. 600/2014, Title VII, art. 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44. In details, ch. 
1 regulates the supervision power for financial instruments and structured deposits while ch. 2 focuses the attention 
on derivatives. 
64 A Structured Deposit is the combination of a deposit and an investment product. The returns on a Structured 
Deposit may depend on the performance of the underlying investment product - market indices, equities, 
commodities, interest rates, fixed-income securities, foreign exchange rates, or a combination of these. 
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and on the investor protection65. In particular, MiFIR Regulation66 states how and under what 
conditions a competent authority can intervene prohibiting or restricting the marketing, 
distribution or sale of certain instruments or activities; a competent authority can take action in 
precise circumstances:  
 
 a financial instrument, structured deposit or other activities may affect negatively the 
investor protection or may be a threat for the integrity of stability of the whole financial 
system or commodity market or at least affect the financial system of a specific member 
state; 
 the legislative requirements applicable to the mentioned instruments and financial 
activities in the previous point, in accordance with European Union law, are not able to 
face the risks and in any case a better and more efficient application of these 
requirements would not able to face the problem in an efficient way; 
 the authority can intervene if it considers the action is proportionate to the risk 
identified, features and level of sophistication of investors, impacts on investors who 
may hold it; 
 the competent authority has consulted competent authorities of other Member States 
where the action could have a significative impact; 
 the action has no a discriminatory impact with respect to the services or activities 
provided by another Member State; 
 it has consulted public bodies competent for the supervisory, administration and 
regulation of agricultural markets under Regulation n. 1234/200767 where a financial 
instrument or activities can represent a threat for the normal functioning and integrity 
of agricultural markets. 
 
In general, all the actions taken in place by the competent authority aim at preserving the 
integrity of the market and the investor protection68. 
An important distinction is needed to keep in mind between powers of NCAs and powers of 
ESMA and EBA. 
                                                          
65 The criteria to define this are summarized in: complexity of product in relation to the client, the degree of 
innovation of the product, the leverage the product provides and the size or notional value of an issuance of 
products, Art. 42 (7) in Regulation n. 600/2014. 
66 Art.42 (2) of Regulation (EU) No. 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014. 
67 Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural 
markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation). 
68 Capriglione F., “Prime riflessioni sulla MiFID II (tra aspettativa degli investitori e realtà normativa)”, in “La 
MiFID II, rapporti con la clientela, regole di governance, mercati”, pp. 171-210, a cura di Troiano V., Motroni R. 
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The intervention is the task of NCAs primary and then of ESMA and EBA in the event that 
national authorities have not taken in place some measures or in case the measures adopted are 
not sufficiently suitable to solve the problem69; hence ESMA (for financial instruments) and 
EBA (for structured deposits) cover a coordination role in relation to actions taken by NCAs 
ensuring that those actions are correct, efficient and proportionate70. 
Product intervention can be considered as a complementary rule 71  of product governance 
because the Regulator has decided to introduce these two provisions both with the aim at 
improving investor protection72. 
The harmonization of the supervision system is not a simple target because requires an efficient 
cooperation among authorities and for this reason is surely considered a far-reaching goal, but 
it is another fundamental step towards a better investor protection. 
 
Commodity derivatives 
In addition to the believes that market efficiency is based on successful behavioural and 
transparency rules, after the financial crisis, it started to spread the idea that the quality of 
instruments exchanged represents another important pillar for the correct functioning of the 
market 73 . MiFID II, through the implementation of product governance and product 
intervention, provides to authorities some new techniques to steer derivatives market towards 
an upper level of resiliency. Moreover, in particular, MiFID II and MiFIR intervene on 
commodity derivatives 74  improving transparency in the market and attempting to limit 
speculation activities restricting the maximum number of positions taken in the 
abovementioned financial instruments. 
These tools of intervention have marked the legislative framework representing a breakthrough 
with respect to the previous regulatory policy that was not able to manage the intrinsic riskiness 
of derivative contracts. Through the application of the new MiFID II the legislator has decided 
to widen the number of instruments subject to the discipline, restricting the exemption (in order 
to reduce the speculation) and limiting the position adopted that doesn’t have hedging 
                                                          
69 Guarracino F., “I poteri di intervento sui prodotti finanziari (la c.d. product intervention)”, in “La MiFID II, 
rapporti con la clientela, regole di governance, mercati”, pp.231-260, a cura di Troiano V., Motroni R. 
70 Busch D., “Product governance and product intervention under MiFID II/MiFIR”, in “Regulation of the EU 
Financial Markets: MiFID II and MiFIR”, Oxford University Press, pp. 123-146, a cura di Busch D., Ferrarini G., 
2017. 
71 Recital 29 of Regulation (EU) n. 600/2014. 
72 Sesti G., “Going further on investors’ protection: product governance, product intervention and the role of 
ESMA”, In Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto dell’Economia, Gennaio 2016. 
73 Lemma V., “La sicurezza degli strumenti finanziari derivati dopo le nuove definizioni della MiFID II”, in “La 
MiFID II, rapporti con la clientela, regole di governance, mercati”, pp. 327-337, a cura di Troiano V., Motroni R. 
74  The application of the definitions in Sections C6 and C7 of Annex I of Directive 2004/39/EC (MiFID), 
Guidelines of ESMA. 
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purpose75. In general, the intervention of the Regulator through the MiFID review (introduction 
of product intervention)76, the EMIR77 Regulation and MiFIR Regulation allowed to major 
operation in particular on OTC market that by definition it is ever more affected by opaqueness. 
 
Non-EU investment firms 
The access of third-country firms to the EU markets was not harmonised under MiFID I.  
Going to a strong harmonisation of European regulatory framework, MiFID II has introduced 
a regime concerning the access of third-country to the European market based on a qualitative 
equivalence assessment conducted by the Commission78. The new regime will be applied in the 
supply of cross-border investment services and activities only respect to professional investor 
or eligible counterparties. In a period of three years and during the assessment process remains 
into force national dispositions that regulate the market access for intermediaries of third-
countries 79 . Once the Commission has decided an equivalence measure and ESMA has 
established cooperation arrangement with third-country authorities and, after an application 
with ESMA, the non-EU investment firms can provide services to professional clients and 
eligible counterparties without establishing a branch in a Member State; otherwise third-country 
firm can operate in Member State under the national regime and without exploit EU passport. 
On the contrary, for services provided to retail clients by a third-country firm, Member States 
will continue to adopt national dispositions80. An important issue to take into consideration 
regards the provision that states MiFID II is not applied when investment services are supplied 
with the initiative of EU clients. 
 
Investor protection 
The investor protection is the core of MiFID II that attempts to broaden all provisions 
concerning investment services and introducing high-level obligations. The new rulebook 
increases the study of each service in relation to client classification and includes conduct of 
business requirements (aims at improving investor protection and market efficiency) and 
organisational requirements (aims at strengthening market integrity and resiliency). 
                                                          
75 Alibrandi Sciarrone A., Grossule E., “MiFID II e commodity derivatives”, in “La MiFID II, rapporti con la 
clientela, regole di governance, mercati”, pp. 495-512, a cura di Troiano V., Motroni R. 
76 A specific provision about derivatives is disciplined in Regulation (EU) n. 600/2014 in Art. 42, Par. 2. 
77 European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) is an institution for the regulation of over-the-counter 
derivatives since 2012. 
78 Bonante G., Gallicchio M., “MiFID 2 e MiFIR, recenti sviluppi”, in Rivista di Diritto Bancario, Febbraio 2014. 
79 Di Nella L., “Features of the New Financial Markets Law (MIFID 2 AND MIFIR)”, 15 in Revista Brasileira 
Direito Civil 119, 2018.    
80  “Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II): frequently asked questions”, Memo European 
Commission, 15 April 2014. 
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Investment services can be affected by81: 
 
 asymmetric information due to limited financial education and private information 
detected by investment firms; 
 high switching costs and sunk costs derived by the difference in knowledge between 
parties; 
 bias in decision-making process that affect investor; in particular it refers to “cognitive 
bias” derived from the behaviour of retail investors that often violate the rationality and 
economic principles. 
 
MiFID II82 aims at improving investor protection with the implementation of some measures: 
 
 General behavioural principles, so when investment firms provide investment services 
or ancillary services, they have to act honestly, fairly and in the best interest of client; 
they then provide appropriate, correct and comprehensible information in a good time. 
 Regulation of information about financial products and costs; the information shall be 
appropriate, correct and comprehensible. 
 It is now required the records of all telephone conversations and electronic 
communications for some type of services. 
 Product governance represents one of the most relevant innovation in MiFID II and it 
consists in a discipline that regulates both the entire market system, investment 
firm/client relationship and manufacturer/distributor cooperation. This investor 
protection provision ensures that financial products have a high degree of compatibility 
with each group of clients (target market) from the manufacturing process to the 
distribution process. It is requested in this way a restyling of the investment firm’s 
organisation83. The theme will be considered in a deeper manner in chapter three. 
 Important innovations are taken in place in the field of independent advice that 
complements the classical advisory process. Each investment firm can choose the type 
of advice but with a previous communication to the client explaining if it is a classical 
or independent advice to guarantee the maximum level of transparency84. In order to 
                                                          
81 “MiFID 2.0: Casting New Light on Europe’s Capital Markets”, Pierre Francotte, Diego Valiante and Karel 
Lannoo, report of the ECMI-CEPS task force on the MiFID review. 
82 Art. 24, Section 2 of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
83 Di Nella L., “Features of the New Financial Markets Law (MIFID 2 AND MIFIR)”, 15 in Revista Brasileira 
Direito Civil 119, 2018.   
84 Pezzuto E., Razzante R., “Finalità e contenuti della direttiva 2014/65/UE (MiFID II) e del regolamento (UE) 
n. 600/2014 (MiFIR)”, in “MiFID II: le novità del mercato finanziario”, Ch. 1. 
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comply with new legislation, the independent advice process is based on an offer of a 
wide set of diversified financial products and without any inducements85. The investor 
can properly choose financial products through a careful support and fruitful 
relationship with a skilled advisor who will act as a guide in each phase86. 
 Strengthen requirements of suitability and appropriateness: in the transparency 
relationship between intermediary and client there is a double side of analysis: the 
process of information to client and the process of information receipted from the client 
(know your customer rules). This latter process is strictly linked to suitability rule, in 
fact the operations acted by the client should be suitable based on investment services 
offered by intermediaries; the suitability procedure, as reported in art. 25 (2), is 
requested for investment advice and portfolio management. The strengthen of suitability 
rule is driven by the fact that the investment firm, in the offer of these services, has a 
relevant active role87; following these obligations, the investment firm supplying these 
services must obtain client’s knowledge and experience, client’s financial situation, the 
capacity to bear losses and client’s investment objectives, and in addition it shall 
communicate to client if it will provide a periodic assessment about suitability of 
services. 
Appropriateness rules is referred to art. 25 (3) of MiFID II but it is not a real restyling 
of the previous regime; it is applied to all other services excluding investment advice 
and portfolio management. The main difference with respect to suitability rule regards 
the information set requested by banks in order to provides these type of services; in 
general appropriateness obligations are less stringent88 in term of gathering information 
process than suitability obligations. 
 PRIIPs stands for Packaged Retail and Insurance-Based Investment Products; the value 
of these types of financial instruments is correlated with a lot of disparate market 
variables or underlying activities. The PRIIPs Regulation was introduced from January 
201889 for the purpose of increasing transparency; a useful tool created in order to 
improve transparency and investor protection is the key information document (KID), 
that allows investor to make a simple comparison with other financial products. This 
                                                          
85 Recital 72 and 73 of  Directive n. 2014/65/UE of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
86 Capriglione F., “Prime riflessioni sulla MiFID II (tra aspettative degli investitori e realtà normativa”, in “La 
MiFID II, rapporti con la clientela, regole di governance, mercati”, pp. 171-210, a cura di Troiano V., Motroni R. 
87 Colombo C., “Adeguatezza, appropriatezza e mera esecuzione nell’offerta di servizi di investimento”, in “La 
MiFID II, rapporti con la clientela, regole di governance, mercati”, pp. 57-80, a cura di Troiano V., Motroni R. 
88 Information to be collected for purpose of assessing appropriateness regards only client’s knowledge and 
experience. 
89 Regulation (EU) n. 1286/2014 of European Parliament and the Council of 26 November 2014. 
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concise and investor-friendly pre-contractual document should support retail clients 
towards the best choice through a series of parameters like market risk, liquidity risk, 
credit risk, costs/benefits and performance scenarios of simple comprehensibility90. The 
argument will be explained later in the following chapter in a more detailed manner. 
 The new legislative packaged aimed at improving, inter alia, the intermediary’s 
discipline correcting the flaws of the previous directive; in compliance with new 
directive, the investment firm has to follow all steps for preventing possible conflicts of 
interest91; in case of the investment firm is not able to avoid the problem, it shall disclose 
to client the nature of the conflict of interest and all reasonable measures to mitigate it 
before undertaking business92.  
An interesting point regards the switch of some textual specification (in the Italian 
MiFID II translation), in fact in the new directive the verb “manage” (“gestire” in the 
Italian text of MiFID II) in relation to conflict of interest is replace by the verb “prevent” 
(“prevenire”) that represents a stronger requirement transferred to intermediaries93. 
The other turbulent theme, strictly related to conflict of interest, that MiFID II attempts 
to regulate is the theme of inducements94. The renew provisions regard, in particular, 
investment advice, portfolio management and the supply of other investment services; 
there are two types of inducements, monetary benefits and non-monetary benefits and 
two distinct classes of services that require different obligations, namely independent 
investment advice and portfolio management on one side and other investment services 
on the other. The Directive lays down that any inducements is forbidden except for95 
the second class of services for which are allowed inducements only if they increase the 
quality of the service and if doesn’t damage the procedure of the investment firm to act 
honestly, fairly and professionally in the best client’s interest 96 . In the case that 
inducements are allowed, the investment firm has to communicate to client the 
existence, the essence, the size of payment and the methodology97.  
  
                                                          
90Bonante G., Lener F., “Cosa sono i KID dei PRIIPs?”, in Financial Community Hub, 2016. 
91 Recital 56 and Art. 16 (3) of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of the 15 May 
2014. 
92 Art. 23 of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of the 15 May 2014. 
93 Ginevri Sacco A., “Il conflitto di interessi fra intermediari finanziari e clienti nella MiFID II”, in “La MiFID II, 
rapporti con la clientela, regole di governance, mercati”, pp. 471-490, a cura di Troiano V., Motroni R. 
94 Art. 24 (7), (8), (9) of Directive 2014/65/UE of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
95 Art. 24 (9) of Directive n. 2014/65/UE of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
96 Perrone A., “Tanto rumore per nulla? Per un ripensamento della disciplina sugli inducements”, in Banca Borsa 
Titoli di Credito, fasc. 2, 2016. 
97 Di Maio D., Vianelli A., “Ricerca in materia di investimenti e inducements nel regime MiFID II: una lettura 
critica delle novità regolamentari introdotte”, in Rivista di Diritto Bancario, Aprile 2018. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Information to Retail Client and Investor Protection 
 
MiFID II, that replaced the previous version (Directive 2004/39/CE), attempts in primis to 
increase the end client protection through a higher level of transparency, a more accurate 
information set and more stringent obligations for intermediaries. The most relevant tools, 
through which the new directive wants to reach a better investor protection framework, are the 
product intervention and product governance rules, the conflict of interest regime and a more 
accurate training staff system for intermediaries. In term of transparency, the main innovation 
in favour of the end client are the introduction of a rigorous costs system (including costs and 
fees of investment and ancillary services and the cost of financial product)98 and an easy but 
detailed information document (from January 2018 there is in addition the KID document). All 
the new provisions were created with the final goal to offer to investors a sounder and safer 
financial environment; in order to reach this goal, the Regulator has developed a series of 
legislative tools, among which the most important have been illustrated in the previous chapter, 
exploited as a means of restoring investor confidence. Even the tools that don’t affect directly 
the investor protection, they will probably have, in any case, an effect of end client through 
their influence of other factors. 
 
 
2.1  Product Governance Overview 
MiFID II has introduced with Product Governance regime, a set of obligations for 
intermediaries requiring a specific organizational system and rigorous behavioural rules related 
to the creation, supply, distribution of financial products to end client; these new rules represent 
a transformation in the construction and in the development of investor protection99. The 
Regulator has decided to introduce a new regime because the sale of inadequate financial 
products is responsible for serious damages affecting the end client and the relationship between 
him and the intermediary (retail conduct failure) and producing detrimental effect on integrity 
                                                          
98Art. 24 (4), point C of  Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014. 
99 Sesti G., “Going further on investors’ protection: product governance, product interevention and the role of 
ESMA”,  in Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto dell’Economia, p. 86, Gennaio 2016. 
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and stability of the market (market conduct failure)100. Now the investor protection should not 
be considered only as strict relationship between intermediary and client, but it has to be 
considered a step backward in the sense of the procedure is now incorporated and has origin in 
the internal process of firm; in other words, in virtue of product governance, the end client 
protection phase is anticipated within the product designing phase101. This provision disciplines 
the thorough relationship between manufacturer and distributor, the two main players of the 
product governance process. Investment firm should act in the best interest of client according 
with the directive’s obligations, understand rigorously the product in order to identify the target 
of clients to whom the investment products will be offered.  Member States should ensure that 
products are tailor-made in accordance with the features of the pre-identified target market, 
distributed through an adequate distribution strategy and periodically monitored102.  
It’s important to bear in mind that the discipline of product governance is considered in addition 
to conflict of interest regime, suitability, appropriateness and information to client requirements 
and not only a simple substitution procedure. The obligations of product governance involve 
all the players acting in the manufacturing and distribution process; in order to comply with 
these obligations, they must implement a strict cooperation in some relevant phases. The Final 
Report of ESMA establishes that the staff should have adequate skills to comprehend the 
relevant factors affecting financial instruments and it should be subject to a training program 
before the effective creation of the product103. During the approval process is necessary an 
accurate analysis of the financial product with the aim to avoid any risks, conflict of interest or 
an injury to the market. 
It is clear that the investment firms have to reorganize the internal structure in order to respect 
product governance rules; then ESMA gave to the compliance function a fundamental role 
namely the supervision, the review and the assessment of product governance obligations for 
the purpose of preventing or solving any possible risk of failure for the firm to comply to its 
obligation104. 
The Regulator through the application of product governance rules has attempted to reduce the 
risk of mis-selling105 (and in this way improving investor protection level). In the case of the 
                                                          
100 Sciarrone Alibrandi A., “Dalla tutela informativa alla porduct governance: nuove strategie regolatorie dei 
rapporti tra clientela e intermediari finanziari”, in Rivista della Regolazione dei mercati, Fascicolo 1, 2016. 
101 Mocci F., Facchini J., “Product governance: le Linee guida ESMA di definizione del target Market”, in Rivista 
di Diritto Bancario, Luglio 2018. 
102 Recital 71 of  Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May. 
103 Morlino S., “La product Governance nel nuovo regime MiFID 2”, in Rivista di Diritto Bancario, Aprile 2015. 
104 Sesti G., “Going further on investors’ protection: product governance, product interevention and the role of 
ESMA”,  in Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto dell’Economia, pag. 89, Gennaio 2016. 
105  Febbrajo T., ““Misselling” di prodotti finanziari. I doveri di buona fede e correttezza in soccorso dei 
risparmiatori traditi”, in Diritto Civile Contemporaneo, Anno III, numero I, Gennaio/Marzo 2016. 
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product governance could not provide the expected result, competent authorities can intervene 
to reduce the diffusion of dangerous financial products. 
 
 
2.2  PRIIPs Regulation 
The Packaged Retail and Insurance-based Investment Product Regulation (PRIIPs Regulation) 
was introduced on 3rd January 2018 by the European Regulation n. 1286 of November 2014106. 
The Regulation is applied to packaged retail investment products and insurance-based 
investment products and only when such products are sold to retail clients. PRIIPs are products 
whose value is subject to fluctuations due to the exposure to the performance of underlying 
assets or other variables.  In relation to the former type of product, the term “packaged” is 
referred to the fact that investors are subject to fluctuations in the market; the investment 
component means that the product offers a medium-long term capital accumulation that beats 
risk-free rate. 
These types of products are typically sold by banks to retail investors, for example when they 
want to save for different purposes like purchase a house. In this way PRIIPs can provide a lot 
of benefits for investor but the degree of complexity and the poor transparency of this products 
can hamper the regular trend of financial market.  
It should be noted that the PRIIPs represent the core of the European retail financial investment 
and cover a range of products worth around ten thousand billion euros in Europe. For this 
reason, a simple and synthetic document that guides the investors in their investment choices is 
necessary. 
In order to solve some problems linked with this type of product was introduced the PRIIPs 
Regulation for the purpose of (i) overcoming the heterogeneity among the legislation of 
different Member States, (ii) improving the transparency and (iii) the comprehensibility of these 
products through the insertion of a standardised disclosure document known as Key 
Information Document (KID). The KID is a three-pages document107 and attempts to make 
easier the comprehension of the key features of products as well as the comparison among 
different financial instruments; for this reason, the KID is a pre-contractual document that must 
be available before the underwriting phase. It should be delivered to the investor without any 
payment, in a good time before the conclusion of the negotiation and including the key 
                                                          
106 Regulation (EU) 1286/2014 of European Parliament and the Council of 26 November 2014. 
107 Möllers T. M. J., “European legislative practice 2.0: dynamic harmonisation of capital markets law – MiFID 
II and PRIIP”, in Banking & Finance Law Review, pp.141-176, 2015. 
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information of the product108; the following bullet list summarizes the most relevant features 
provided to retail client109: 
 
1. market risk, liquidity risk and credit risk assessment; after the evaluation of these risks, 
the financial product is assigned to one of seven specific classes, namely the Summary 
Risk Indicator (SRI). Such classification depends on market risk (computed between a 
range from 1 to 7 and called Market Risk Measure MRM) and credit risk (represented 
by a scale from 1 to 6 called Credit Quality Step CQS). Then the investment firm has to 
provide information about the methodology adopted for the calculation of the end risk 
class and the subsequent explanation of the placement in a specific class. If we take into 
consideration a classification based on market risk, PRIIPs are divided in 4 groups: 
 
 PRIIPs that allow losses greater than the invested amount (derivative with a low 
degree of liquidity); 
 PRIIPs linearly linked with performance of the underlying financial instruments 
(unit-linked without warranty); 
 PRIIPs not linearly linked with performance of the underlying financial 
instruments (structured products); 
 PRIIPs that present a value depending on not observable market variables 
(insurance products with dividends’ participation depending on the discretion of 
insurance company). 
2. Performance estimation must consider at least four payoff scenarios that are distressed, 
unfavourable, moderate and favourable; these scenarios are computed with a crossing 
calculation among the specific features of instruments, the market conditions and a time 
period generally included in one, three or five years. The manufacturer could decide to 
provide a further performance scenario whenever it considers the risks are not clearly 
represented. If instead the analysis is considering an insurance or derivative product, the 
investment firm must provide compulsorily an additional scenario (linked with 
occurrence of the incident in the insurance product case)110. 
3. Costs and fees scheme related to the investment service provided111. 
                                                          
108 For a deeper analysis see Art. 8 of Regulation (EU) n. 1286/2014 of European Parliament and the Council of 
26 November 2014. 
109 For a deep analysis of KID see Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/653 of the Commission of 8 March 2017. 
110 Bonante G., Lener R., “Cosa sono i KID dei PRIIPs?”, in Financial Community Hub, 2016. 
111 Aleandri M., “Valutazione del rischio di mercato di prodotti tradizionali in gestione separata in base al nuovo 
regime informativo per i PRIIPs”, 6 Dicembre 2016. 
 
 
31 
 
4. The objective of investment, the policy and the investment strategy. 
5. The description of the underlying assets specifying the degree of liquidity. 
6. The description of capital protection mechanism. 
7. The disclosure about the possibility of insolvency of the PRIIPs’ issuer. 
8. All necessary data for a complaint by the client as a consequence of any identified 
problem. 
 
However, the core of information is composed by the MRM (based on a measure of an index), 
performance scenarios and risk/rewards scheme which represents financial risk of the product. 
In fact, it would seem that now the attention of the client is focused mainly on financial risk 
respect to the specific financial product; it often happens that now the comparison is carried out 
through the analysis of SRI rather than the analysis of the product considered112. It can represent 
the transition from a classical information to a numerical information. 
The manufacturer of the PRIIP is considered the unique player with a responsibility related to 
the content of KID; furthermore, in order to assess the accuracy of information, the document 
should be revised at least annually113.  
The PRIIPs definition comprehends several financial products like convertible bonds, 
derivatives, structured products, investment funds, structured deposits114 and some insurance 
products; conversely the definition doesn’t include non-life insurance products, some life 
insurance contracts, structured deposits subject to interest rate fluctuation only, company 
shares, sovereign bond and pension products. 
Manufactures are responsible for the precision of information presented in the document due to 
the fact they are the authors of KID; distributors instead must deliver the document in an 
appropriate time-period in order to allow the client to choose the PRIIP after an accurate 
comparison with other similar products115. 
The PRIIPs Regulation have had a troubled and complicated legislative path which persuaded 
the Regulator to modify the original regulation through the introduction of new Regulatory 
Technical standards. 
The most relevant innovations regard: 
                                                          
112 Lupoi A., “Il tramonto dell’informazione letterale, l’alba dell’informazione numerica?”, in Rivista di Diritto 
Bancario, April 2017. 
113 Valdes M., “PRIIPs: le novità al Key Information Document previste nella consultazione ESMA, EBA ed 
EIOPA”, in Rivista di Diritto Bancario. 
114 Giuliani G., “I depositi strutturati nella MiFID II”, in “La MiFID II, rapporti con la clientela, regole di 
governance, mercati”, pp. 313-326, a cura di Troiano V., Motroni R. 
115 Cascinelli F., Sasso F., P., “Il Regolamento PRIIPs. I nuovi RTS e il recepimento in Italia con il D. Lgs. 
224/2016”, in Rivista di Diritto Bancario, Aprile 2016. 
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 The KID of multi-option products has to be drafted following a specific shape and 
scheme contents; 
 An additional performance scenario representing a distressed situation in order to 
provide to the client a wider framework; 
 The initial disclaimer related to the complexity of the product can be omitted for simple 
instruments; 
 The disclosure of administrative costs in relation to biometric risk 116  of insurance 
products117 namely the impact of the biometric risk premium on the investment’s reward 
and the cost’s effect of the biometric risk premium. 
 
The idea behind the introduction of the KID explains that, a simple and standardise information, 
covers a fundamental role for investors since it motivates them to invest after an accurate study 
and a comparison among different investment products. This approach it would seem another 
vital step towards a higher degree of investor protection and a market transparency’s 
improvement. In any case, an important concept to keep in mind is the complementary role of 
the intermediary; it is important that the intermediary, before providing the KID, have made a 
precise screening of products to offer to end clients; this, for example, means that the 
intermediary shouldn’t offer to a beginner investor a product with a risk profile equal to 7118. 
The PRIIPs Regulation should be analysed accordingly with the provisions of MiFID II and 
IDD119 for a wider interpretation.  
Since the features of MiFID II have been mentioned previously, it is necessary a brief overview 
of IDD in order to better understand how all these rulesets together form a unique legislative 
package. 
The IDD Directive with the Delegated Regulation 2017/2359120 have replaced IMD 1121  and 
discipline some obligations about the distribution of specific insurance investment products, 
rules about conflict of interest regime and inducements, information and suitability 
                                                          
116 Biometric risk includes the risk of death, invalidity and longevity. 
117 Art. 2 (4) of Delegated Regulation (EU) of the Commission of 8 March 2018. 
118 Menicucci M., “Finanza comportamentale e scenari probabilistici: brevi riflessioni sul KID”, in Rivista di 
Diritto Bancario, March 2018. 
119 Directive (EU) 2016/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 January 2016 on insurance 
distribution (recast). 
120 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/2359 of 21 September 2017 supplementing Directive (EU) 
2016/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to information requirements and conduct of 
business rules applicable to the distribution of insurance-based investment products. 
121 Directive 2002/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 December 2002 on insurance 
mediation. 
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requirements 122 and product governance regime basing on the rules already delineated by 
MiFID II. In particular, the distribution of insurance investment products is disciplined by the 
Directive 2016/97 integrated with the Delegated Regulation n. 2017/2359 together considered. 
The IDD Directive is strictly linked with PRIIPs and MiFID II because insurance products 
compete with products of other sectors covered by securities regulation (MiFID II) and in this 
way the negotiations over IDD is directly related to MiFID II and PRIIPs Regulation123. 
In general, the new IDD has the aim to provide a higher protection of policyholders through a 
good-quality information set and an honest behaviour of distributors124. 
                                                          
122 Marino D., Pantaleo A., “Distribuzione di prodotti di investimento assicurativi: le nuove regole di condotta 
europee”, in Rivista di Diritto Bancario, Gennaio 2018. 
123 Willemaers G. S., “Client protection on European financial markets-from inform your client to know your 
product and beyond: an assessment of the PRIIPs Regulation, MiFIDII/MiFIR and IMD 2”, in Revue Trimestrielle 
de Droit Financier, Vol. 4, no.4, November 2014. 
124 Lembo M., “Il nuovo quadro normativo degli inducement e della consulenza tra due differenti discipline: 
MiFID 2 e IMD 2. Brevi note.”, in Rivista di Diritto Bancario, Gennaio 2018. 
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For the sake of clarification, an example of PRIIPs KID is presented below; it represents a KID 
of a non-UCITS investment fund issued by FundWorld Fund Manager Limited. 
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        Source: Fund Assist 
 
Conversely is important to bear in mind that a UCITS125 fund is a mutual fund generally safe 
and well-regulated resulting in a high level of investor protection126 
                                                          
125 UCITS stand for Undertakings for the Collective Investment of Transferable Securities and is a regulatory 
framework that aim at harmonizing the management and sale of mutual fund throughout Europe. 
126 Hazenberg J.J., “Independence and focus of Luxembourg UCITS fund boards”, in European Journal of Law 
and Economics, Vol. 41, Issue 1, pp. 117-155, February 2016. 
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2.3  MiFID Evolution about Investor Protection 
The investor protection is, without any doubt, the backbone of the body of MiFID II. In the 
global financial market, the end client/consumer covers a fragile role due to deep asymmetric 
information in respect of the intermediary that affects negatively the relationship. Several facets 
of asymmetric information may be identified in the economic/financial framework: 
 
 the agency model127, namely the relationship between agent and principal, concerns 
problems of asymmetric information originating in the misbehaviour of the 
intermediary which operates on behalf of the client128; 
 the asymmetries originated from the evaluation of complex financial products that are 
often composed by the union of more “opaque” products; 
 the difficult in the assessment of risk/reward factors that affect the value of the product; 
 the asymmetries regarding the bargaining power in term of unilateral termination of the 
contract, modification of the pre-identified conditions and other intrinsic features of the 
contract; 
 the organisational asymmetries and the difficult access to justice129. 
 
In this way the investor is not always able to properly understand the features of financial 
products and the related risks and this problem leads investors to make unaware choices. In 
fact, the imbalance of the two economic players here considered is not based anymore on the 
different in bargaining power like in traditional models, but is much more focused on the 
disparity in the knowledge of financial products: therefor is not sufficient a strong starting 
knowledge because is necessary a permanent updating of the market trend and all the other 
variables which can affect the value of financial instruments130. The Regulator attempted to 
solve this disparity through the introduction of a legislative scheme in order to maximize the 
accessibility of information for clients.  
Hence the principal objective is to provide to end clients a wider overview about financial 
instruments and investment profile allowing them an immediate risk perception131. Another 
                                                          
127 Greco G. L., “La tutela del risparmiatore alla luce della nuova disciplina di “risoluzione” delle banche”, in 
Banca Impresa Società, a. XXXV, n.1, pp. 77-110, 2016. 
128 Scarpa D., “Un’analisi economica del diritto: teoria dell’agenzia e rapporto di amministrazione”, in Altalex, 
15 Giugno 2009. 
129 Calliano O., “Informazione e trasparenza nei contratti bancari e finanziari tra diritto dei consumatori e nuovo 
diritto europeo dei servizi bancari e finanziari”, in Rivista di Diritto Bancario, November 2014. 
130 Acierno M., “I diritti dell’investitore nella giurisprudenza di legittimità”, in Rivista di Diritto Bancario, 
Novembre 2017. 
131  Greco F., “Dall’informazione pre-contrattuale alla product governance: la tutela del risparmiatore tra 
paternalismo normativo e nuovi modelli di controllo”, in Rivista di Diritto Bancario, October 2017. 
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important element linked with the necessary revision of investor protection regards the ever-
increasing complexity of financial instruments provided by investment firms; the complexity 
of financial products led to a difficult interpretation for retail clients which doesn’t have the 
necessary financial knowledge.  
The reform of policy framework is conducted through the introduction of MiFID II Directive, 
MiFIR Regulation, Delegated Directive n. 2017/593132 , a group of Delegated Regulations and 
some Technical Standards of ESMA with the aim at granting a higher investor protection, 
overcoming a model focused only on transparency in favour of a model based on concrete 
customer care133. 
In particular MiFID II disciplines investor protection in section II; this section collects 
provisions to ensure investor protection and it is composed by seven articles.  
The first part of this section regards the so-called “general principles and information to 
clients”. Following these obligations, in order to reach a higher degree of investor protection, 
the investments firms134 shall always act in the client’s best interest in an honest, fair and 
professional manner and at the same time they shall provide financial products of which 
creation and distribution are suitable for a specific target market. The duty to act in accordance 
with the best interest of client represents the fulcrum of the detailed conduct of business rules 
within MiFID II and its implementing measures and plays a central role in their 
interpretation135. This phase shall be preceded by an accurate knowledge of the products. The 
information provided shall be fair, clear and not misleading and in the case of investment firm 
supply investment advice, it shall communicate if the advice is in independent or traditional 
form. The advice service is considered independent if are met two conditions: the intermediary 
offers a broad and diversified range of financial products and the prohibition to receive fees or 
monetary and non-monetary benefits provided by third-party136. 
Another important point, disciplined in the investor protection section, regards the information 
about costs and fees related to the investment service. If the advice is provided in an independent 
                                                          
132 Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593 of 7 April 2016 supplementing Directive 2014/65/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council with regard to safeguarding of financial instruments and funds belonging 
to clients, product governance obligations and the rules applicable to the provision or reception of fees, 
commissions or any monetary or non-monetary benefits. 
133 Santoro V., “Crisi bancarie, ruolo dell’informazione e protezione del cliente”, in  Estudios sobre derecho de 
la insolvencia, a cura di Bartolomè D. G., Pacchi S., Pèrez del Blanco G., Eolas Ediciones, Leòn, pp.849-858, 
2016. 
134 Investment firm is defined in Art. 4, Par. 1 of Directive 2014/65/EU as: “any legal person whose regular 
occupation or business is the provision of one or more investment services to third parties and/or the performance 
of one or more investment activities on a professional basis”. 
135 Enriques L., Gargantini M., “The expanding boundaries of MiFID’s duty to act in the client’s best interest: the 
Italian case”, 3 Italian L.J 485, in the Italian Law Journal, Vol. 03-n. 02, 2017. 
136 Scolari M., “Un restyling per la consulenza finanziaria”, in Financial Community Hub, 17 Novembre 2014. 
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manner or in case of portfolio management, the investment firm shall not accept or retain fees 
and commissions provided by any third-party in relation to the service supplied to client. 
The investment firm could offer a package of products but, in this case, it shall communicate 
to client if the products can be sold separately indicating costs and risks of any single product. 
Member states in exceptional case should impose to investment firm additional requirements 
but they must be justified in a good manner. 
The Commission is entitled to adopt Delegated acts, basing on Art. 89, with the aim at ensuring 
the respect of requirements stated in Art. 24 of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European 
Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 regarding provisions about information, assessment 
criteria of products, inducement rules137. 
The following part of the same section regards the assessment of suitability and  
appropriateness and reporting to clients. 
Member states communicate to investment firms that, who provide investment advice, 
information or other investment service to client, has the right competences and skills; the 
investment firm must be able to demonstrate it to authorities on request. In particular, the 
investment firm providing investment advice or portfolio management 138  must obtain all 
necessary information 139  from client in order to offer a suitable investment service or 
instrument; otherwise, for all the other investment services, excluded those previously 
explained, the investment firm must collect all the information useful only to provide an 
appropriate service. The obligations required for investment advice, for example, are higher 
than obligations required for other services, because in this case, the retail client leaves a 
consistent part of his own investment decision to the advisor; hence, the final result of the 
investment belongs, in a large part, to advisor’s professional quality140. 
The suitability rule instead, is applied only to investment advice and portfolio management, 
where the investor protection requested is higher due to the intrinsic features of these two 
services, and it is composed by double-phase process: the assessment of suitability includes the 
phase of knowledge of all characteristics of the client (know your customer rule) through a deep 
analysis of the features and the gathering information phase of the products (know your 
merchandise rule)141. In the former phase, under MiFID II there is a major attention on the 
                                                          
137 Art. 24, Section II of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014. 
138  Final Report – Guidelines on certain aspects of the MiFID II suitability requirements, 28 May 2018. 
139 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/ 565 of 25 April 2016 supplementing Directive 2014/65/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the Council as regards organisational requirements and operating conditions for 
investment firms and defined terms for the purposes of that Directive. 
140 Hobza M., “Investment services and protection of the retail client”, in The Lawyer Quarterly, Vol 5, No 1, 
2015. 
141 Salerno M. E., “Con la MiFID II nuovi obblighi informative per l’intermediario a tutela dell’investitore”, in 
Financial Community Hub, 19 Giugno 2017. 
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quality and the quantity of information; the intermediary, in order to have a broad knowledge 
of the client, requests the experience and knowledge of the client, the capacity to bear losses, 
the risk propension in term of risk/reward parameter, and the risk tolerance142. Regarding 
knowledge of products, the new Directive requires to all manufacturers and distributors a strong 
knowledge of the products in order to decide at the origin of the process the perfect matching 
between client and products and the subsequent distribution strategy. This phase is strictly 
linked with the innovative product governance regime. This fundamental process should lead 
to a perfect matching between clients and financial products.  In the case of the client doesn’t 
provide a minimum quantity of information to investment firm, the firm must communicate to 
the client that it is not able to determine the appropriate service or products.  
When the investment firm provides investment services like receipt or transmission of order 
and execution only, it has not to obtain all the information (appropriateness assessment) 
previously described if some specific conditions are met: the most relevant provisions concern 
shares or bond traded in regulated market or an equivalent market and that don’t embed 
derivative, money-market instruments excluding those that embed a derivative instruments, 
share or units in UCITS, excluded structured143 UCITS144, structured deposit excluded complex 
structured deposit and other not complex financial instruments. In order to avoid the gathering 
information phase, other than the aforementioned conditions, additional requirements have to 
be met: in the case of the service is provided at the initiative of client or the investment firm 
has clearly communicated to the client that these types of services don’t request the 
appropriateness assessment or if investment firms comply with the obligations in Art. 23. 
Then, there are other provisions for the investor protection regarding records that includes 
document concerning all obligations between client and investment firm and reports that 
investment firm shall provide to client for periodic communications145. 
In the next part, the Directive discipline the provision of services through the medium of another 
investment firm. 
 
                                                          
142 For a broad and detailed explanation see Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 of 25 April 2016 
supplementing Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards organisational 
requirements and operating conditions for investment firms and defined terms for the purposes of that Directive. 
143  Discussion Paper – ESMA’s policy orientations on guidelines for UCITS Exchange-Traded Funds and 
Structured UCITS. 
144 UCITS that provide investors, at certain predetermined dates, with algorithm-based payoffs that are linked to 
the performance, or to the realisation of price changes or other conditions, of financial assets, indices, or reference 
portfolios. 
145 For a deeper analysis see Art.25, Section II of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the 
Council of 15 May 2014. 
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Member States then can agree to an investment firm to receive instructions from another 
investment firm to offer investment services on behalf of a client; here there are two different 
sides of responsibility: the investment firm which supply the instructions is responsible for the 
accuracy, suitability and completeness of information provided while the investment firm that 
receives the information is responsible for service provision and order execution146. 
In the following section, the Directive takes into consideration all the provisions regulating the 
obligations to execute orders in the most favourable way to the client. 
An investment firm shall follow all necessary steps to obtain the best result for its client 
considering all variables affecting the order execution phase; in a particular case, when 
investment firm receives specific instructions from client, it shall execute the order following 
the instructions. In the execution phase, the investment firm shall not receive any remuneration 
or non-monetary benefits as a consequence of address orders in a specific trading venue which 
is in contrast to conflict of interest and inducement obligations.  
Then, any execution venues shall publish data about prices, costs, speeds and probability of 
execution relating to the quality of service on that venue annually without the payment of any 
fee. 
For execute orders in the best condition, investment firms shall implement specific mechanism 
and strategies and then it has to provide to client all appropriate information about execution 
policy. Member states shall require to investment firm to revise periodically the execution 
arrangements and execution policy to assess if the strategy lead to the most favourable result 
yet. The end client, on request, has the right to obtain a demonstration that the investment firm 
have executed the order in accordance with the execution policy adopted147. 
The best execution is linked with a continuous revision process of conditions by the 
intermediary in order to assess periodically the validity of the adopted strategy148. The best 
execution is based on a wide set of criteria but if we consider the retail client, the best result is 
correlated with the price of financial instruments and the cost associated to the execution 
service149. 
Other than provisions about best execution orders, member states shall require to investment 
firms to execute order in a rapid, fair and efficient manner in relation to other clients’ orders or 
                                                          
146 For a deeper analysis see Art. 26, Section II of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the 
Council of 15 May 2014. 
147 For a deeper analysis see Art. 27, Section II of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the 
Council of 15 May 2014. 
148 Capriglione F., “Varietà dalla trasparenza alla “best execution”: il difficile percorso verso il “giusto prezzo””, 
in Banca Borsa Titoli di Credito, fasc. 4, p. 475, 2009. 
149 Lannoo K., “MiFID II and the new market conduct rules for financial intermediaries: will complexity bring 
transparency?”, in ECMI policy No. 24, May 2017. 
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respect to the trading interests of the investment firm. This rule is disciplined through the Art. 
28, namely client order handling rules150. 
Investment firms can appoint tied agent but they have to comply with some obligations 
disciplined in the section known as obligations of “investment firms when appointing tied 
agents”. Tied agents generally are appointed with the aim of promoting or soliciting business, 
receiving orders, placing financial products or providing advice related to that investment firm. 
An important thing to keep in mind in this context regards the burden of responsibility of any 
action conducted by the agent; it remains in the hands of investment firm. Hence, Member 
States shall require to investment firm to monitor the activities of tied agents in order to assess 
and guarantee that they continue to comply with Directive’s obligations. 
Tied agents have to be registered in the public book only after the evaluation of their knowledge 
and competence in a specific field151. 
In the last article of section II are disciplined transactions executed with eligible counterparties. 
Investment firms can have an economical relationship with eligible152 counterparties without 
comply with articles 24, 25, 27, 28, with the exception of paragraphs 4 and 5 of Art. 24, 
paragraph 6 of Art. 25 and paragraph 1 of Art. 28. 
This article concludes the section of MiFID II concerning provisions to ensure investor 
protection. 
In addition to these new requirements, there is the broadening of the means of transparency; it 
now represents a necessary tool for the client in the adequate choice of products and investment 
services.  
The transparency sense is expanded towards the intermediary’s activity as well as the classical 
informative relationship with the client 153 ; it is now regards, in other words, all the 
organisational structure and activities of the intermediary system. The concept of transparency 
concerns, under the new rulebook, not only the information aspect, but also the conduct rules 
of the intermediaries in order to remove each possible harmful misbehaviour for the client154. 
It seems to be a sort of transition period that highlights the switch of the focus of investor 
                                                          
150 For a deeper analysis see Art. 28, Section II of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the 
Council of 15 May 2014. 
151 For a deeper analysis see Art. 29, Section II of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the 
Council of 15 May 2014. 
152 See Art. 30 (2) and (3) of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 
to have a complete list of eligible counterparties. 
153  Franza E., “Gli obblighi dell’intermediario nella distribuzione di prodotti finanziari, alla luce degli 
orientamenti ESMA e della comunicazione Consob del 22.12.2014”, in Rivista di Diritto Bancario, Marzo 2016. 
154 Mezzasoma L., “Meritevolezza e trasparenza nei contratti finanziari”, in Banca Borsa Titoli di Credito, fasc.2, 
p.180, Aprile 2018. 
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protection from the classical information model to a system based on the direct and preventive 
action of the intermediary155. 
All the new aforementioned requirements can be evaluated positively; a deeper and sounder 
relationship between investment firms and clients, based on a higher degree of information, can 
lead to a more financial stability as well as a more accurate investor protection.  
Market transparency and investor protection are the two most important pillars of the new 
legislative package; through the application of the innovative provisions they will contribute to 
financial stability and consumer confidence. 
The effort to improve investor protection is not only limited to the Section II of MiFID II 
(provisions to ensure investor protection) that includes only a part of the all innovations 
regarding investor protection; for the sake of simplicity of the analysis, a list of the main themes 
discussed in the previous paragraphs are summarized in the following bullet list: 
 
 Assessment of suitability and appropriateness  
 Data reporting  
 Provisions of services through the medium of another investment firm 
 Best execution obligations 
 Client order handling rules 
 Independent advice 
 Conflict of interest and inducements regime 
 Obligations of investment firms when appointing tied agents 
 Transactions executed with eligible counterparties 
 
However, the abovementioned list is not exhaustive; indeed, for a broad analysis, other rules 
introduced through the new legislative package are noteworthy. 
The Regulator, to complete the discipline about investor protection, has introduced rules among 
which, the most relevant regard a more detailed client classification, the product governance 
rules and product intervention regime. 
The professional operator, in our analysis the investment firm, has to provide different type of 
information to clients based on the well-known client categorisation; other than information 
                                                          
155 La Rocca G., “Sottoscrizione e “forma informativa” nei contratti del mercato finanziario”, in Rivista di Diritto 
Bancario, Giugno 2017. 
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obligations based on client classification, the quantity and the content of information depend 
also by the service provided156. 
Client classification represents a core theme in the field of information to clients and protection 
because each different group of clients is subject to different level of protection and 
transparency. The client classification under MiFID II is very similar to the previous model in 
MiFID I although there are some differences. The clients are assigned, after an accurate analysis 
carried out by the intermediary, to three different group: retail client157, professional client and 
eligible counterparties characterized by homogeneous behaviour and features. In general 
legislator wants to assure a broad stream of information for all clients158 but in particular 
increasing the level of information and protection for retail clients.  
With regard to retail client class, which is considered the weakest category due to the lack of 
knowledge, expertise and skills, the information should be provided in a detailed manner 
including indication of risks through the use of a well-known font size; in any case all 
information should be delivered in a consistent and updated way; when the information 
provided regards future performance, the information must not be based on past simulation and 
must be supported by objective data. In addition to this, the new directive requirements impose 
analysis of performance scenarios in different market situations considering the nature and risks 
of financial product included in the analysis. 
In relation to professional counterparties159, the Regulator has decided however to strength the 
requirements; some of these are similar to those of retail clients: the indication of benefits that 
must be communicate in relation to potential risks, the information must not minimize important 
items or warnings and it must be accurate and updated. An investment firm, when dealing with 
professional counterparties, can limit the flow of information provided except in the case of 
investment advice and portfolio management service or when are negotiated financial 
instruments that includes derivative instruments. 
If we consider eligible counterparties, the information obligations were not required under 
MiFID I, while they were disciplined since the introduction of MiFID II regulations. A broad 
package of information is now requested also when investment firm provides services to 
eligible counterparties; the most relevant information obligations regard the delivery of 
information about services, products, investment strategies, execution venues and costs and 
                                                          
156 Mazzei G., “Violation of the financial intermediary’s information requirements between invalidity of the 
contract and contractual liability”, in Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto dell’Economia, January 2018. 
157 Retail client is defined in Art. 4, Point 11 of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council 
of 15 May 2014  and is defined as residual category that is client which are not eligible nor professional client. 
158 Perrone A., “Servizi di investimento e regole di comportamento. Dalla trasparenza alla fiducia”, in Banca 
Borsa Titoli di Credito, fasc. 1, p. 31, 2015. 
159 Annex II of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014. 
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charges. Even in the case of a relationship with an eligible counterparty 160 , the flow of 
information provided can be limited in specific circumstances. 
In general, the introduction of the new legislative package aims at widening the information 
obligations and allowing the clients to understand the maximum amount of information in order 
to make a choice as much as possible rational161. 
Hence, the client’s profiling represents a core theme to stabilise the right level protection just 
like the old directive stated. The intermediary through standardized questions should be 
discover the risk profile of the client and then makes a first macro-distinction placing each client 
in a different cluster. Once decided where a specific client is arranged in one of the three cluster, 
the intermediary can apply specific rules, provide the right information and assess the suitability 
or appropriateness of a product. Other than this classical type of categorisation, potential clients 
can be divided in further two macro-categories: the already known clients and the unknown 
clients. 
About the classical distinction, the client’s profiling process shall consist of two different 
phases162: the first one encompasses the inclusion in one of the three cluster and the second in 
the analysis of knowledge, risk attitude, financial stability and current asset owned. The 
preliminary categorisation, namely the arrangement in different cluster, has to be carry out to 
understand if other information is needed or it already represents a thorough basket of data to 
move towards the negotiation stage163. 
At the end of the assessment there is not an automatic and rigid classification, but the parties 
can negotiate together the appropriate category. The investment firm can reclassify the clients 
shifting them from a category to another and, as consequence of this, it is also modified the 
level of protection and information needed.  
In this context is fundamental the distinction in two sub-classes of the professional clients’ 
category. This distinction recognizes the “per se” professional client, which are those 
disciplined in Annex II of MiFID II, and the “elective” professional clients 164 ; the latter 
category of professional clients represents those clients who are non-professional but require to 
be treated as professional.   
 
                                                          
160 Art. 30 of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014. 
161 Busch D., “MiFID II: stricter conduct of business rules for investment firms”, in Capital Markets Law Journal, 
vol. 12, iss.3, pp. 340-380, November 2017. 
162 Motroni R., “La classificazione della clientela nella normativa dei mercati degli strumenti finanziari”, in 
Rivista di Diritto dell’Economia, dei Trasporti e dell’Ambiente, Vol. XIII, 2015. 
163 Motroni R., “La profilatura del cliente nella MiFID II”, in “La MiFID II, rapporti con la clientela, regole di 
governance, mercati”, pp. 405-423, a cura di Troiano V., Motroni R. 
164 Van Gerven W., Kruithof M., “A differentiated approach to client protection: the example of MiFID”, in 
Society of European Contract Law, July 2010. 
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      Source: Dechert LLP 
 
This change of category is not automatic based on a negotiation between the parties, but it must 
be subjected to an accurate assessment; it consists in a process formed by qualitative, 
quantitative and procedural criteria165: 
 
1. Qualitative requirements: this phase consists on an adequate assessment of knowledge, 
experience and capability that assures, in a reasonable manner, that the client is able to 
make his own investment decision and understand the risk involved in the operation; 
2. Quantitative requirements: a client has to satisfied at least two of the following criteria 
in order to become a professional counterparty:  
 the client had carried out operations, in a significative size, on the relevant 
market with at least a frequency of 10 operations per quarter in the last three 
quarters; 
 the value of portfolio, cash deposit and financial instruments must exceed 
€500,000; 
 the client works or had worked in the financial sector covering a professional 
position for at least one year. 
3. Procedural requirements: 
 a retail client must communicate in writing form that he wants to be treated as 
a professional client; 
                                                          
165 Moloney N., “Investment firms and investment services” in EU securities and financial market regulations, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 352-354, 2014. 
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 the investment firm has the burden to communicate to client the decreasing level 
of protection that now the client can exploit; 
 client has to communicate in writing form, in a specific document, that he is 
aware of the protection he is losing and the directly linked consequences. 
 
The stricter conduct-of-business regime was implemented through the new legislative package 
with the aim to strength contract-related conduct of business rule and limit the misleading 
behaviour of intermediaries. In this way the Regulator has attempted to reduce the vulnerability 
of retail client as well as the weaknesses of the other market players. 
Such new rulebook aims at limiting the autonomy of retail investors in order to avoid they 
undertake dangerous financial operations and restricting each possible misleading behaviour of 
intermediaries towards end clients166.All this restyle model regarding investor protection is 
accompanied by other two important innovations introduced, namely product governance and 
product intervention. These two new regimes are entitled to guarantee the stability of financial 
system through the protection of investors; product governance rules ensure that each financial 
instrument is designed and created to match needs, characteristics and objectives of an 
identified target market of end clients; an important thing to bear in mind is that such regime 
doesn’t run out its function in the manufacturing process. In fact, it is characterized by an 
intense interaction with the distribution process that has the burden to sell the product to the 
specific pre-identified167 target market. This chained process is possible only with a perfect 
stream of information among the players; the information flow has to be precise, updated and 
detailed. Hence it is clearly visible that the information represents the foundation also in the 
phases that precedes the actual sale phase to end client. In addition to the ex-ante product 
governance rules, the new rulebook has introduced an ex-post provision known as product 
intervention regime. Member states, through product intervention tools, are entitled to prohibit 
or restrict the marketing, distribution or sale of some financial products if they could represent 
a threat to the normal functioning, stability or integrity of financial system as a whole. In this 
context, product intervention is considered the natural complement tool of product governance 
rule useful to stem the risks inherent in the increasingly complex financial products168. 
 
                                                          
166 Cherednychenko O. O., “Contract governance in the EU: conceptualising the relationship between investor 
protection regulation and private law”, in European Law Journal, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 500-520, July 2015. 
167 Colaert V., “MiFID II in relation to other investor protection regulation: picking up the crumbs of a piecemeal 
approach”, October 2016. 
168 Schaeken Willemaers G., “Product intervention for the protection of retail investors: a European perspective”, 
in Risques, crise financière et gouvernance: colloque transatlantique, 27 January 2013. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Product Governance 
 
3.1  Introduction to Product Governance 
Product governance, that was introduced through the implementation of the MiFID II package, 
is probably considered the most innovative discipline in the field of investor protection. 
In the legal framework of MiFID II, the manufacturing and distribution process of product are 
subject to a new discipline; it aims at regulating intra-firm processes and procedures. The 
financial products considered in this discipline are not limited to shares, bonds and derivative 
instruments but are also included transferrable securities, money-market instruments, financial 
contracts and emission allowances169. 
The product governance regime affects the environment both on the side of market regulation 
and structural organisation of firm and on the side of intermediary/client relationship. It 
represents the breakthrough for a large part of financial system addressing new rules to several 
fields. 
The product governance provisions aim at regulating all the steps of the investment firms/client 
chain starting from the introduction of new rules that must regulate the complex phase170 of 
product engineering, the subsequent relationship between the manufacturer and distributor, 
passing through the sale process to the end client up to the final customer care and monitoring 
in the ex-post selling phase171. 
In order to comply with this new regime, the investment firms firstly have to reorganize the 
internal structure; a sort of suitability assessment is implemented both in the manufacturing and 
distribution process. 
In this way, the product governance imposes to intermediaries a new organisational form and 
behavioural ruleset in the creation and distribution of financial products. The investment firm, 
represented by an intermediary in the relationship with the end client, is now obliged to respect 
                                                          
169 For a deeper analysis about financial instruments included in the product governance discipline see Section C 
of Annex I of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014. 
170 Final Report – ESMA’s Technical Advice to the Commission on MiFID II and MiFIR, pp.52-53 of 19 
December 2014. 
171 Annunziata F., “Servizi e attività di investimento: regole di condotta e di organizzazione interna. I contratti e 
la separazione patrimoniale”, in La disciplina del mercato mobiliare, G. Giappichelli editore, Torino, pp. 156-159, 
2015. 
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precise and rigid rules for the purpose of ameliorating the position of the investor in the financial 
environment, in term of protection, in a hypothetical hierarchical structure. Hence, once again, 
the main goal of the Regulator is to restore the investor confidence through a more efficient 
protection system. 
The investor protection is not anymore applied only in the final distribution and selling phase 
but begins at the origin of the process, entering in this way, in the basis of intermediary’s 
organisational framework. 
For what concern an ideal supply chain of financial product, a four-phases process can be 
identified and regards the conception of the product, the creation, the distribution strategy and 
the final selling stage. During the period of the old financial legal framework, the attention was 
focused mainly on the final phase assuring that the financial product offered was fitted with the 
profile of the client; some evidences asserted that, since the rules were applied only in the final 
phase (distribution and selling phases), this approach were not able to ensure a good investor 
protection anymore.  
It is possible to state that in the old system, an investment firm could sell each type of product 
to each category of clients without distinction only in respect to information requirements, 
transparency obligations and conduct rules and after a communication to the client about the 
features of the instrument. Now, with the new legislative package, the aim is to ensure that a 
specific product cannot be sold indistinctly to all categories but only within a pre-identified 
target market. 
Following the old approach, a direct consequence was a lack of attention in the early stages, in 
particular, in the designing phase that now covers, in the new regime, the starting point in the 
products’ supply chain as to the investor protection. 
The ESAs172, European Supervisory Authorities, have adopted in 2013 a joint position173 in 
theme of product governance and supervision known as Product Oversight and Governance 
process. The joint position174175 is considered a tool through which the authorities can assume 
a unique vision in cross-sectoral situations; however, each of the supervisory authorities is 
entitled to apply the rules in their sectorial field. Hence, this new regime is applied by EBA 
                                                          
172 Joint Position of the European Supervisory Authorities on Manufacturers’ Product Oversight and Governance 
Processes, JC-2013-77. 
173 Art. 56 of Regulation (EU) 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 November 2010 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (EBA). 
174  Art. 56 of Regulation (EU) 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 November 2010 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (ESMA). 
175 Art. 56 of Regulation (EU) 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 November 2010 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (EIOPA). 
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through the Art.74 of CRD IV176 following the EBA Final Report177 provisions; an analogue 
process is followed by EIOPA in the insurance sector178. These principles have played a central 
role in the MiFID II Directive and within important Opinions179 adopted by ESMA with respect 
to the selling of complex products180. 
The new rules of product governance are mandatory for investment firms when they are 
involved in the manufacturing and distribution process of financial products and which are 
located in the European Economic Area. More precisely, the new regime is applied to MiFID 
firms but also the non-MiFID firms are affected indirectly. 
The product governance regime can be identified in different legislative context: first of all it 
can be analysed as intermediaries’ organisational rules, that is all the provisions about internal 
structure, distribution policy, inducement regime and the responsibility’s issues; secondly it can 
be considered as a set of conduct rules that disciplines the activity of intermediation, in 
particular the relationship between intermediary and end client; then the last but not the least 
sense of product governance can be included in the meaning of tool, more precisely the means 
through which the manufacturer and distributor of financial products are directly connected. 
The latter product governance sense is then divided in other sections of legislation based on the 
type of investment firm involved (MiFID firm or non-MiFID firm)181. 
After the overview of product governance, it is necessary to understand how this chained 
process operates in detail in order to comprehend how the process represents a very efficient 
innovation for the investor protection. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
176 The Capital Requirements Directives (CRD) for the financial services industry have introduced a supervisory 
framework in EU that reflects the Basel II and Basel III ruleset on capital measurement and capital standards; the 
new CRD IV package was introduced in 2013 and is an updated form of the old CRD and has the aim to transpose 
into EU law the rules of Basel III. When we talk about CRD IV we refer to EU Directive 2013/36/EU and EU 
Regulation 575/2013. 
177 Final Report, Guidelines on product oversight and governance arrangements for retail banking products, 
EBA/GL/205/18 of 15 July 2015. 
178  Consultation Paper on the proposal for preparatory Guidelines on product oversight and governance 
arrangements by insurance undertakings and insurance distributor, EIOPA-CP-15/008 of 30 October 2015. 
179 Opinion on MiFID practices for firms selling complex products, ESMA/2014/146 of 7 February 2014. 
180 Opinion on Structured Retail Products-Goods practices for product governance arrangements, ESMA/2014/332 
of 27 March 2014. 
181 Troiano V., “La Product Governance”, in “La MiFID II, rapporti con la clientela, regole di governance, 
mercati”, pp. 213-226, a cura di Troiano V., Motroni R. 
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3.2  A Deep Analysis of Product Governance Rules and an Insight into 
Manufacturer and Distributor Legal Framework 
From January 3rd, 2018, product governance regime is applied to investment firms, banks, 
managers of undertakings for collective investment in transferrable securities (UCITS) and 
alternative investment funds (AIFs) which provide investment services and are established in 
the Economic European Area. For the sake of clarification, it is useful to bear in mind the 
sources of legislation around which the product governance framework is implemented. The 
most relevant sources of legislation are represented by: 
 
• Recital 71 MiFID II182 
• Article 9 (3) of MiFID II183 
• Article 16 (3) MiFID II, paragraphs 2-6184 
• Article 24 (2) MiFID II185 
• ESMA’s technical advice of 19 December 2014, paragraph 2.7186 
• Delegated Directive 2017/593 adopted by the commission on 7 April 2016, Recitals 15-
20 and Art. 9 and Art. 10 of Chapter III (Product Governance Requirements)187and 
ESMA’s consultation paper containing draft guidelines on MiFID II product 
governance requirements of 5 October 2016, primary focus on target market 
assessment188. 
 
These product governance provisions are entitled to make safer and sounder all the process 
regarding the financial product value chain; so, all investment firms that manufacture or 
distribute financial products are subject to these new obligations. Despite the new regime is 
directly applied to MiFID firms, that means all the investment firms established in a member 
states in which MiFID rules are in place, also non-MiFID firms are indirectly affected when: 
 
                                                          
182 Recital 71 of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014. 
183 Art. 9 of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014. 
184 Art. 16 of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014. 
185 Art. 24 of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014. 
186 Paragraph 2.7, p. 47 of Final Report, ESMA’s technical advice to the Commission on MiFID II and MiFIR of 
19 December 2014. 
187  Recitals 15-20 and Chapter III of Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593 of 7 April 2016 
supplementing Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to safeguarding 
of financial instruments and funds belonging to clients, product governance obligations and the rules applicable to 
the provision or reception of fees, commissions or any monetary or non-monetary benefits. 
188 Consultation Paper, Draft guidelines on MiFID II product governance requirements of 5 October 2016. 
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 have a cooperation with MiFID firms, more precisely when doing a business with 
MiFID firm; 
 they act as distributor on behalf of MiFID investment firm189, that is when a firm 
distributes financial products that are manufactured by MiFID firms. 
 
The relationship between MiFID firms and non-MiFID firms, that is the relationship between 
manufacturer and distributor which are not subject to the same legislation, represents a thorny 
theme which requires a deeper analysis and a precise assessment of the information exchanged 
in the delicate field of privacy. This topic will be faced in the section regarding the cooperation 
between manufacturer and distributor in which will be examined also the relationship between 
MiFID firms and non-MiFID firms. 
For the purpose of proceeding with the analysis of product governance, in this first part, is 
useful to highlight how MiFID II has approached the product governance regime; scholars have 
established that product governance can be viewed through three different perspectives: 
 
1. Corporate governance approach 
From the corporate governance perspective, the management body190 of the investment 
firm covers an active and central role in the implementation of product governance 
regime. MiFID II addresses the duty to implement an internal policy to each investment 
firm. This policy, apparently, must consider the production of financial instruments both 
in accordance with the risk tolerance of the firm and the needs of clients mainly. In this 
way the investment firm has the encumbrance to implement, approve and supervise the 
product governance process in accordance with the dispositions provided by MiFID II. 
It is obvious that also in this perspective, the obligations are applied both to 
manufacturer and distributor191. In order to grant the maximum level of control over the 
process, investment firm have to provide reports to NCAs on request. 
 
2. Investor protection approach 
                                                          
189 “Product governance rules under EU MiFID II: practical considerations for US-based DCM practitioners in 
the eurobond market”, in Linklaters, December 2017. 
190 For a deeper analysis of Management body see Art. 9 of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and 
the Council of 15 May 2014. 
191 Final Report, ESMA’s Technical Advice to the Commission on MiFID II and MiFIR, 19 December 2014, pp. 
56-60, no. 7 and no. 28. 
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In this approach the central role is covered by investor; more in detail, in the investor 
protection perspective the main goal consists in the protection of professional and non-
professional clients. 
Analysing this approach, the attention is focused on the obligations transferred to 
manufacturers and distributors. Following this perspective, the manufacturers has to 
comply with some obligations; the most relevant represent the manufacturing of 
products following the needs, characteristics and objectives of a pre-identified target 
market 192, the choice of an adequate distribution strategy coherent with the target 
market, the certainty that the products is effectively sold to the target clients as well as 
analysis of potential conflicts of interest. 
Conversely, in this approach, the distributor has to collect all the necessary information 
to understand in a deeper way the financial product and then assess if the product 
involved represents a perfect match with the features of the client. These previous steps 
ended with a final assessment carried out by investment firm in order to guarantee that 
the financial product has been actually sold in the best interest of the client and not only 
in respect to an internal budgeting rule. 
 
3. Organisational approach: 
The organisational perspective focuses the attention on the internal process of product 
governance; the step by step procedure affects booth manufacturers and distributors in 
their cooperation. In this context, a relevant role is covered by the compliance 
department that is entitled to guarantee that product governance obligations are 
implemented and applied within the organisation. The core of this approach, that 
actually represents all the product governance process, will be analysed in a specific 
section below. 
 
The product governance regime is directly applied to all MiFID firms in the whole 
manufacturing and distribution process and when they advise corporate issuers on the launch 
of new financial instruments. MiFID firms, under these obligations, have to ensure that all 
financial products are created in order to match precise features of potential end client that are 
grouped in target classes. The natural complement of the manufacturing phase is the distribution 
process and also in this case the distribution strategy must be consistent and compatible with 
the identified target market. 
                                                          
192 Art. 24 (2), Section II of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014. 
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In addition to the other innovations introduced by the new legislative package, the product 
governance is probably considered one of the most important tool useful to protect investors, 
with a particular attention to the retail client. The investments carried out by retail clients 
contribute to finance the economy and then are a useful tool to protect wealth for health, 
education and retirements needs in case of adverse situations. The strict regulation about 
product governance should encourage them to invest in European financial markets because 
they become aware to rely on an organized process of manufacturing and distribution that, in 
all phases, has the objective to meet the needs of end clients. This system should allow them to 
make investment choices in a more rational and accurate manner limiting the threats to financial 
system and the product intervention actions by the authorities193. 
Through the analysis of the Recital 71 of MiFID II194, it is possible to outline the general 
principles of the new regime: 
 
 First of all, it is remarkable the fact that the intermediary must understand in a deeper 
manner all the products’ features both in the supply/recommendation phases, it has to 
analyse them and then choose an appropriate strategy to identify the target market; so, 
for example, a very complex product shouldn’t be sold to a retail client195. 
 The manufacturer must guarantee that financial products are created and developed to 
allow a perfect match with the needs, characteristics and objectives of clients and that, 
the subsequent distribution strategy is suitable to deliver financial instruments to the 
identified class of end clients. Therefore, manufacturer and distributor, have the duty to 
assess, on a regular basis, the correct functioning of the process both with respect to the 
market identification and the expected reward of products.  
 In order to assure that financial instruments are offered in the best interest of clients, if 
the intermediary is not the same player that have manufactured the instruments, it must 
obtain and comprehend all the information necessary in relation to the approval process, 
the features of the product and the target market. 
 In the case of the intermediary offers or recommend a product created by a non-MiFID 
firm, it has to use adequate strategy to obtain the information about the product196. 
 
                                                          
193 Schaeken Willemaers G., “Client protection on European financial markets – from inform your client to know 
your product and beyond: an assessment of the PRIIPs Regulaton, MiFID II/MiFIR and IMD 2.”, Revue 
Trimestrielle de Droit Financier,Vol. 4, no.4, p. 1-32, November 2014. 
194 Recital 71 of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014. 
195  Greco F., “Dall’informazione pre-contrattuale alla product governance: la tutela del risparmiatore tra 
paternalismo normativo e nuovi modelli di controllo”, in Rivista di Diritto Bancario, October 2017. 
196 Morlino S., “La Product Governance nel nuovo regime MiFID 2”, in Rivista di Diritto Bancario, Aprile 2015. 
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The product governance regime must be considered in addition to and not in substitution of 
information’s obligations, suitability and appropriateness rules, conflict of interest and 
inducements regime. Other than these rules, the Regulator has introduced product governance 
regime to assure that investment firms, in the creation and distribution of financial products and 
structured deposit, act always in the best interest of client during the whole life-cycle of 
products or services. 
The Regulator, through ESMA’s Guidelines, aimed at promoting a greater convergence in the 
implementation and application of the requirements provided by MiFID II. 
Hence, in this dissertation, I’ll try to illustrate the wide arrangement governing product 
governance regime, including the related processes, in a detailed manner and grouping the 
countless provisions through a set of key points: 
 
 Identification of the target market for financial instruments 
 Distribution of financial products to the target market 
 Regular review of financial instrument to ensure that it is reaching the target market 
 The responsibility of management body 
 
 Identification of target market for financial instrument: 
The identification of the target market assumes three stages before the distribution of the 
product. In this analysis, for the sake of exposition, I have divided the product governance 
in four main key points. However, in order to be precise as much as possible, it is useful to 
explain that, before the marketing and distribution stage, are taken in place other procedures 
namely the identification of the target market, the creation of the financial instrument and 
the product approval process. In the dissertation these three steps are explained together 
within this first key point. 
The investment firm must have in place an approval process197 to identify the potential target 
market for a specific financial product and specify the clients’ needs, features and objective 
that can lead to a perfect match with the instrument. It is possible to define that the product 
approval process will provide a preliminary identification of target market, the analysis of 
all factors, variables and risks that can affect such target market and the assessment of the 
consistency of the distribution strategy. 
The product approval process must be conducted before the marketing and distribution 
process and always in relation to the potential target market; it’s worthy of note that, the 
                                                          
197 Art. 16 (3) of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014. 
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product approval process doesn’t substitute the suitability and appropriateness tests but 
represents a distinct procedure. This process, hence, shall identify the target market for a 
financial product within the relevant category of clients and should ensure that all the 
relevant variables and risks affecting the target market are evaluated as well as the 
consistency of the distribution strategy. In particular, the manufacturer should assess the 
following elements in the product approval process198: 
 
 it must ensure that all the risks correlated with the identified target market are 
assessed; 
 it must evaluate that the product does not affect negatively the end client and does 
not represent a threat for the correct functioning and integrity of the market199;  
 it shall assess any possible event of conflict of interest and should avoid any 
occurrence in which the end client could be negatively affected by a conflict of 
interest issue; 
 the product testing phase, in which the investment firm must provide a scenario 
analysis, assess the risk of possibility to obtain bad outcomes and define in what 
cases negative events can occur. Therefore, it shall evaluate the financial instrument 
under distressed condition (Stress test) that could be represented by200: 
♦ counterparty risk or financial problems may occur and affect negatively 
manufacturing or third party involved in the process; 
♦ a market environment deteriorated; 
♦ problems in the diffusion of the financial product; 
♦ problem in the demand/supply model in which the demand for a specific 
instrument is higher than expected. 
 it must be carried out an assessment analysis that ensures the product meets all the 
needs and objectives of target market201; 
 the manufacturer has to assess the charging structure for the financial instrument 
and evaluate if: 
                                                          
198 Busch D., “Product Governance and Product Intervention under MiFID II/MiFIR” in “Regulation of the EU 
Financial Markets: MiFID II and MiFIR”, Oxford University Press, pp. 123-146, a cura di Busch D., Ferrarini G., 
2017. 
199 Final Report – ESMA’s Technical Advice to the Commission on MiFID II and MiFIR, p. 56 (no. 5), 19 
December 2014. 
200 Article 9 (10) of Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593 of 7 April 2016. 
201 Article 9 (11) of Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593 of 7 April 2016. 
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♦ the scheme of costs and charges is fair with respect to the features of the 
client; 
♦ the charges don’t affect negatively the expected return of the instrument; 
♦ the structure of charges is easily understandable by the clients. 
 
The process of target market’s identification must be carried out in a granular level; more 
precisely, potential investors are divided in disparate classes of target market and each of 
them represent a different combination of knowledge, experience, financial situation, risk 
tolerance and investment objectives that will be accurately explained in the next paragraph. 
In this phase, that is considered the most important in the product governance process, the 
investment firm should also identify other classes of client for whose needs, features and 
objective are not compatible with the product taken into consideration202. In this relevant 
step, the roles covered by manufacturer and distributor are important; although the strict 
cooperation, they present different approaches in the identification of target market.  
First of all, the manufacturer, in order to identify the potential target market203, should 
conduct both quantitative and qualitative analysis.  
ESMA through a Guideline204 has provided a series of categories that should be used by 
manufacturer as a starting point to establish the target market for its products. The 
manufacturer should use each category to assess the matching degree between the product 
and each class. The Regulator requires to manufacturer to not exclude any category during 
the assessment and, in the case of the manufacturer considers not enough exhaustive the 
number of classes for the analysis, it can propose and add supplementary categories. This 
modification of the pre-identified categories with respect to the classical guideline can lead 
to a complication in the communication and cooperation between manufacturer and 
distributor. Hence, the inclusion of additional categories is recommended only in specific 
and limited cases wherever additional classes are fundamental to identify a significative 
target market. 
It is important to bear in mind that manufacturers can identify only potential target market 
because they don’t generally have a direct contact with end clients. In fact, a manufacturing 
firm that produce internally financial instruments, but distributes them through an external 
investment firm, shall determine and analyse the features of the potential target market only 
                                                          
202 See Article 9 (9) of Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593 of 7 April 2016. 
203 Mocci F., Facchini J., “Product governance: le Linee guida ESMA di definizione del target market”, in Rivista 
di Diritto Bancario, Luglio 2017. 
204 ESMA Guidelines on MiFID II product governance requirements of 5 February 2018. 
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basing the assessment on their theoretical knowledge and experiences with similar 
instruments and investors205. 
The manufacturer initially has to take into consideration five categories defined by ESMA 
and assess in a deeper manner the features of both the classes and products in order to 
identify a possible perfect match206: 
 
a. The type of client to whom the financial product is targeted: 
the first client screening is made on the classical client classification defined by 
MiFID II provisions. The manufacturer has to identify if a financial product is 
compatible with the features, objectives and needs of eligible, professional or retail 
clients. In other words, the manufacturer should indicate to which type of category 
the product is targeted. 
 
b. Knowledge and experience: 
the manufacturer should indicate the knowledge and experience that the potential 
client should have in order to be considered a potential client for a specific financial 
product. The knowledge that the potential client should have, is intended about the 
product’s features, knowledge and experience of areas and variables that can affect 
the instrument. Knowledge and experience can be dependent on each other; in fact, 
an investor could be a potential target client even if he lacks the right experience but 
instead have a deep knowledge that can compensate the poor experience.  
 
c. Financial situation with particular attention on the ability to bear losses: 
in this section, the manufacturer has to explain in detail the quantity of losses that 
the client should be able to bear; it shall indicate the percentage of losses and if there 
are additional payment obligations that may exceed the amount invested. 
 
d. Risk tolerance and compatibility of the risk/reward profile of the financial product 
with the target market: 
Manufacturer should specify the degree of risk tolerance that the potential client 
should have in relation to the risk profile of the financial product. Then it should 
                                                          
205 See Article 9, Chapter III of Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593 of 7 April 2016. 
206 “EU MiFID II product governance rules: Practical considerations for Asia-based DCM practitioners in the 
eurobond market”, in Linklaters, December 2017. 
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classify the level of risk-attitude and provides a detailed description of each risk 
category. 
It should be noted that, in the whole process, there are generally more than one firm 
and each of them can adopt a different approach to define the risk associated to a 
specific instrument. In this way the investment firm should publish the criteria under 
which a potential client is assigned to a specific risk category. The firm should use 
the risk indicators provided by the PRIIPs Regulation207 or by UCITS Directive208 
if it is possible. 
 
e. Clients’ objectives and needs: 
The investment firm should indicate the needs and client’s objectives for which a 
specific instrument is designed and created. For example, an important factor in this 
analysis regards the holding period and the time horizon of the investment. 
Objectives and needs that a financial product should satisfy can be considered in a 
specific or wide range. 
 
This represents the first screening phase carried out by manufacturer in order to identify a 
potential target market. This procedure is based on the analysis of the aforementioned 
categories.  
However, the identification of the target market by manufacturer doesn’t end with the 
abovementioned assessment based on categories, in fact the investment firm has to define 
the target market also basing the attention on the nature of the product. So, following this 
procedure, the choice of the potential target market should be conducted through an 
appropriate and proportionate analysis in relation to the features of the product; the relevant 
characteristics regard the complexity of the product, including costs and charges, the risk 
reward profile and liquidity or its degree of innovation. It is important to remark that, more 
complex a product is, more precisely the identification of the target market will be carried 
out; conversely, the simpler a product is, the less detailed a category may be. As I have 
reported before, the granularity level in the market identification represents a fundamental 
requirement in order to reduce, at minimum values, the possibility that a product is sold to a 
                                                          
207 Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on key 
information documents for packaged retail and insurance-based investment products (PRIIPs). 
208 Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable 
securities (UCITS). 
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group of investors whose needs, characteristics and objectives are not compatible with those 
of the product considered. 
There is a marginal case in which the investor could want a tailor-made financial product; in 
this extreme case the target market of this product will be composed by the single client who 
has ordered the product. 
 
The distributor does not need an approval process, but it is responsible for assessing if the 
product meets the client’s needs and if it is sold in the best interest of client; for these reasons 
it must carry out a more precise analysis of the target market. 
Now the attention is focused on the identification of the target market by distributors209. The 
identification of the target market by manufacturer, as I have explained before, represents a 
sort of “potential” target market because the manufacturer, not having a direct contact with 
end clients, could identify only a potential target market. Conversely, the distributor has to 
define a more precise target market, the “actual” target market; this type of target market 
will be typically a narrower and a more specifically defined subset of the potential target 
market previously identified by manufacturer.  
The analysis, in this case, is based on the information received by manufacturer and 
information received directly by end clients. This information, that includes the proper 
features of the client, the nature of the product and the type of investment service provided, 
could be obtained by the questionnaire or other several sources.  
The categories from which they can identify the target market should be the same used by 
manufacturer; the distributor should usually accept the one chosen by manufacturer, so, in 
this way, it becomes a sort of tidying up process and not a proper selection of a specific 
target market. Then, analysing the information received from the manufacturer and the 
information obtained by desk research, it should identify its own target market. The resulting 
target market will represent the actual group of persons to whom the distributor will offer its 
products and services. Even in the case just considered, the distributor shall obtain the 
maximum quantity of information about actual client and potential client; from potential 
client for example, it can obtain information from other services that it has already been 
provided to that precise investor.  
The distributor is entitled to offer services and products to investors and it should define, in 
a previous moment, a range on offer of these products and services; in the case of it isn’t 
able to evaluate precisely the target market in relation to a particular service or product, for 
                                                          
209 ESMA Guidelines on MiFID II product governance requirements, 5 February 2018. 
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example the execution only service210 for high-complex products or risks, it should be follow 
all the information received by manufacturer. Hence, in particular cases, the distributor could 
assume a prudential approach, deciding to not include in its product assortment a precise 
instrument; otherwise it can communicate to the client that it is not able to assess the 
matching level between the product and the risk profile of the client, but allowing it, in any 
case, to operate on behalf of client without the implementation of the advice service.  
As the manufacturer defines the target market considering the nature of the product, even 
the distributor should choose the target market in a proportionate and adequate manner in 
relation to the product. The assessment of the target market by distributor has two sides of 
interpretation: on one hand the ex-ante evaluation can be affected by the services provided 
by the firm because the depth of the assessment of target market depends on the available 
information that in turn depends on the type of service offered by the firm (in fact is 
important to keep in mind that different services requires different streams of information; 
for example investment advice and portfolio management requires a higher level of 
information than other services); on the other hand the assessment of the target market affects 
the decision about what type of service will be offered in relation to the product’s nature and 
features of clients. 
However, the investor protection decreases if the distributor is not able to make a deep 
assessment of the target market; in this case, the operation can proceed but the distributor 
should communicate to investor that it is not able to evaluate the perfect compatibility 
between instrument and client’s needs. Conversely, if the distributor wants to offer a 
portfolio management service must carried out in any case a deeper analysis of the target 
market211.  
In any case, it is important to bear in mind that product governance rules don’t substitute the 
assessment of suitability and appropriateness that should be carry out subsequently by the 
firm in the provision of investment services to each client212. 
The EFAMA association213 endorsed a standard template useful for manufacturer in order 
to deliver to distributor all the information about target market, costs and charges. The use 
of this template, known as European MiFID Template (EMT) is not compulsory, but a large 
                                                          
210 Avena G., “Execution only: l’intermediario è tenuto al rispetto degli obblighi di informazione e di adeguatezza 
anche nei confronti dell’investitore dichiaratosi esperto”, in Banca e Finanza – servizi di investimento, 19 
Dicembre 2016. 
211 For a detailed example see the document “Product governance – Processo di definizione del target market 
effettivo”, in Credito Cooperativo, Cassa rurale ed artigiana di Cortina d’Ampezzo e delle dolomiti. 
212 Par. 33 of ESMA Guidelines on MiFID II product governance requirements, 5 February 2018. 
213  European Fund and Asset Management Association is the representative association for the European 
investment management industry (EFAMA). 
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number of investment firms have already used this tool to provide data. In the tabs below, 
I’ll illustrate only some section of the European MiFID Template. Commonly, in the EMT 
are reported the general financial instrument information, the features of the investor type, 
the knowledge and/or experience of the potential investor, the ability to bear losses, the risk 
tolerance, the client objectives and needs, the distribution strategy and all the possible costs 
and charges ex ante and ex post. 
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      General financial instrument information 
     Source: ACEPI 
 
This is an example of the information about financial instruments reported in the section 
concerning the general information of financial products. The analysis of these parameters 
is useful to comprehend in detail the instrument taken into consideration. Through the 
identification with the capital letter M and O is stated which information among these are 
compulsory or optional. 
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     Target markets – Investor Type    
      Source: ACEPI 
 
This is the template for the section regarding the information about investors; there are the 
three-classical type of investors: retail, professional and eligible. On the left-hand side is 
indicated the type of financial instruments and in the right-hand side, through the acronym 
Y, N and Neutral is indicated, for each of the instruments provided, if it is possible a perfect 
match between the features of the instrument and the needs, characteristics and objectives of 
the client. 
In the example examined, there are five groups of instruments: leverage instruments214, 
financial product not capital protected 215 , financial product with capital protection 216 , 
                                                          
214 Leverage Instruments are financial products that generally offer high reward but also a high risk. If an investor 
buys this product, he obtains the right to buy or sell an underlying asset at a pre-fixed price and date. 
215 Financial product not capital protected allow the holder to invest in a specific underlying that will affect the 
performance of the instrument. The underlying are generally indexes, commodities or other underlying that are 
difficult to reach through a direct investment by an individual client. The most common are the Benchmark 
Certificates, Discount Certificates and Outperformance Certificates. 
216 Financial product with capital protection is an instrument that allow the investor to bet on rise or fall of the 
underlying but protecting the capital invested. The most common are Equity Protection Certificates and Butterfly 
Certificates. 
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financial products in capital partially protected217, financial products to conditionally capital 
protected218.  
For each of these instruments, is indicated with Y, that states for yes and, N that states for 
Not, if they are suitable and if they meet the needs, characteristics and objectives of the 
category of investors considered. 
 
    Target Market – Ability to Bear Losses 
   
     Source: ACEPI 
 
The tab “ability to bear losses” represents the capacity to bear losses of a specific target 
market. In relation to the features previous explained about financial instruments, we are 
able to assess the matching degree between the capacity to bear losses and the features of 
each financial instrument. It is clear, but important to remark, that for example a financial 
instrument that presents a high risk-level and so can lead to heavy losses is not suitable for 
                                                          
217 The financial product in capital partially protected have the same features of financial instrument with capital 
protection with the exception that the capital is protected only partially, for example 90%, 80% or lower level.  
218 Financial instrument to conditionally capital protected is a financial instrument that allow you to bet on the rise 
of the underlying asset but at the same time  protect the invested capital (in the case only the underlying does not 
touch the protection barrier); in rare case some type of certificates allow to earn even in the event of fall; the most 
common instruments of this type are Airbag Certificates, Cash Collect Certificates, Express Certificate and Twin 
Win certificates. 
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a target market identified with a low or null possibility to lose the capital invested.  
The product governance obligations are applied mainly in respect of the concept of end 
client. In some circumstances, an investment firm can sell a product to professional or 
eligible counterparty that act as intermediary; in this specific case the investment firm is not 
obliged to identify the target market. The investment firm has only the burden to identify the 
target market of end client. In the circumstance already mentioned, the professional or 
eligible counterparties could act as distributor, if they resell the product to end clients, or 
even as manufacturer if they modify the product. It’s obvious that in the two last cases, the 
professional or eligible counterparty, acting as manufacturer or distributor, should respect 
the product governance obligations. 
The target market, in some cases, could be composed by professional or eligible 
counterparties. In this case, with respect to the former category, the investment firm has to 
distinguish if they are “per se” professional client or professional client “on request” because 
this indicates a different degree of knowledge (in fact, it is assumed that the two types of 
professional clients have a different degree of knowledge). In the latter case, if the end client 
class is composed by eligible counterparties, although the product governance obligations 
are compulsory, the assessment of knowledge can be carried out in a less deep manner. 
 
 Distribution of financial instrument to the target market 
As I have explained before, the first step in the product governance process regards the 
identification of a potential target market and an actual target market respectively by the 
manufacturer and distributor; they must identify the target market in order to create a perfect 
match between the features of financial instruments and the needs, characteristics and 
objectives of the target market. A very similar approach is carried out when the investment 
firm has to choose the correct distribution strategy. Even in this step, manufacturer and 
distributor shall identify a distribution strategy in accordance with the needs, characteristics 
and objectives of the target market. 
In this phase, the first step is carried out again by the manufacturer; it is responsible for 
recommending a distribution strategy coherent with the target market and that it can deliver 
the financial instrument to the right target market219. Other than the identification of the 
distribution strategy, the manufacturer has to select the right distributor in order to guarantee 
that services and clients of that distributor are compatible with the target market. Therefore, 
the manufacturer should provide an adequate stream of information in order to ensure that 
                                                          
219 Art. 24 (2), Section II of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014. 
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the distributor can assess precisely the target market220 ; then it should recommend which 
services are more appropriate to provide these financial instruments.  
Once the distribution strategy has been defined by manufacturer, the burden of the choice 
falls again in the hands of the distributor221. 
First of all, the distributor should consider the strategy recommended by the manufacturer 
and then assess if the strategy is correct, otherwise it can decide to adopt a more prudential 
approach, granting a higher level of investor protection, or a less prudential approach. The 
final approach will be identified considering all the relevant features of the product and client 
together. 
In the case of the distributor will decide to adopt a less prudential approach, after an accurate 
analysis, it should report to the manufacturer the information about the choice. The Regulator 
has allowed some deviations from the target market in precise circumstances. The distributor 
has the right to deviate from the target market; it means the possibility to sell the product to 
a client that is not included in the target market. The group of clients not belonging to either 
the positive and negative market of a financial product are located in a sector known as “Grey 
zone”222. This is possible if the product respects particular needs and objectives of the client 
and in the case of the financial instrument respects the suitability and appropriateness rules 
for that precise investor too; the most common reason that involves the deviation from target 
market are diversification and hedging223 purposes. For the sake of simplicity, we can think 
about the sale of an interest rate swap224 (IRS)225 out of the target market; this type of 
financial instrument can be used for hedging purpose226 by a client subject to interest rate 
risk depending on other financial activities in the portfolio. These issues were very 
complicated to solve but ESMA, after some consultations, modified the guidelines in order 
to reach a common solution. Hence, as the consequence of the modification of guidelines, 
every distributor can deviate from the target market justifying in a detailed manner every 
choice; this does not automatically address to the distributor the burden to communicate 
(reporting rules) to manufacturer if it has deviated from the target market for hedging or 
                                                          
220 Section V of ESMA Guidelines on MiFID II product governance requirements, 5 February 2018. 
221 Naccarato M. G., “La nuova governance del prodotto e le regole in fase distributiva” in Rivista di Diritto 
Bancario, Novembre 2016. 
222 Par. 52 of ESMA Guidelines on MiFID II product governance requirements, 5 February 2018. 
223 Hedging strategy is a technique useful to reduce the exposure to various risk. 
224 An Interest Rate Swap (IRS) is an interest rate derivative; it consists in an exchange of interest rate between 
two parties. An Interest Rate Derivative is a derivative instrument whose payments are computed through 
calculation techniques where the underlying benchmark product is an interest rate, or set of different interest rates. 
225  For a deeper analysis see Hull J. C., “Mechanics of interest rate swap”, in Options, Futures and other 
Derivatives, Pearson, pp. 149-154, 2012. 
226 For a deeper analysis see Hull J. C., “Options, Futures and other Derivatives”, Pearson, 2012. 
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diversification purposes. In this sense, the distributor is not obliged to communicate to 
manufacturer if it sells out of the target market a specific financial product for the 
aforementioned purposes after an assessment of suitability between the financial instrument 
and the portfolio. 
Conversely, if the sale of the product occurs in the negative target market for the same 
previous goals, the communication to the manufacturer is compulsory. ESMA guidelines, 
however, recommend the distribution of products in the negative target market only in 
exceptional circumstances 227 . All the specifications of negative target market will be 
explained in the following section.  
In the stage of distribution will be established if the product will be effectively sold to the 
target market identified by the manufacturer at the origin; otherwise the target market will 
change with respect to those identified in the early stage. 
For these reason, manufacturer and distributor should assess for what target market the 
product is not compatible; in order to identify this type of clients they should carry out the 
same strategies applied for the identification of the positive target market228. Even in the 
context of the negative target market, the analysis will present two different output: on the 
side of the manufacturer, considering the fact that it is able to asses only a theoretical 
analysis, will be identified only a potential negative target market; the distributor, for the 
same reason explained in the previous paragraphs, will be able to identify a concrete negative 
target market. 
If we consider, for example, a specific product that presents a speculative aspect, we can 
automatically assert that this product is not able to meet the objectives and needs of a client 
that wishes to hedge and protect the portfolio with low-risk products. In this case the negative 
target market is simply defined considering all the other potential investors that are not 
appropriate to this specific product with respect to their needs and investment objectives; in 
other words, it is incompatible for all the investors out of the positive target market. 
In order to conduct a deep and precise analysis, the assessment should be carried out in 
different manner in relation to the complexity or riskiness of the product. As a consequence 
of this, exist very different target markets in relation to the width of the market.  
In fact, if we consider a very simple product like a plain vanilla instrument229, we will find 
a restrict negative target market; this is verified because the product is compatible for a wide 
                                                          
227 Par. 52, 53, 54, 55 of ESMA Guidelines on MiFID II product governance requirements, 5 February 2018 
228 Par. 67 of ESMA Guidelines on MiFID II product governance requirements, 5 February 2018. 
229 Plain vanilla states for the most basic or standard version of a financial instrument; generally, with this adjective 
are indicated some type of options, bonds, futures and swap. 
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range of investors due to its simple structure230. Conversely, the negative target market of a 
complex financial product is probably wider than the negative target market of a plain vanilla 
instrument; this results from the specific features of complex products which are compatible 
for a restrict class of clients.  
Once identified the negative target market, the investment firm has evaluated that a financial 
product is not consistent with the needs of a specific client class; for this reason a firm, only 
in very rare cases, should sold the product to this client class. In the extreme case in which 
is verified a sale in the negative target market, it must be justified carefully, and analysed in 
a precise manner in all the steps before the selling phase; the whole process must be justified 
and analyse in a deeper way than in the case of the sale out of a positive target market. 
As I have explained previously, the sale of financial products out of the target market should 
occur in limited circumstances; but in the event that this phenomenon is verified in a 
significance amount, it must be reported in an adequate manner for the analysis of the 
products and services provided231. In the final part of the analysis, the distributor should 
interpret and evaluate the information received and it should implement a plan of action in 
order to modify the initial target market or the distribution strategy towards more appropriate 
categories of clients. 
So, in this way, the events regarding the delivery of products and services in a relevant 
amount out of the positive target market has to be communicated to the distributor except in 
the cases of portfolio diversification and hedging purpose; conversely, the sale of products 
in the negative target market should always be reported to the manufacturer and 
communicate to the client even if the final purpose are diversification or hedging. 
 
  Regular review of financial products 
In this part of the process, manufacturer and distributor have to regularly review the financial 
instruments involved232. 
The manufacturer has to assess and revise the financial product considering any occurrence 
that could affect the potential risk to the identified market; it should control if the financial 
product remains consistent with the characteristics, needs and objectives of the target market 
and if it is actually distributed to the right clients or if, conversely, the instrument has reached 
a class of end clients whose needs, characteristics and objectives are not conformed with that 
specific instrument. 
                                                          
230 Par. 69 of ESMA Guidelines on MiFID II product governance requirements, 5 February 2018. 
231 See Article 10 (2) of Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593 of 7 April 2016. 
232  Art. 16 (3) of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014. 
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In general, the manufacturer must review products before it will launch or resell them if it 
knows that there are some events that could affect the potential risk to investor. In addition, 
it should make a periodical evaluation to verify if the product again functions in accordance 
with the intended objectives. The time frame for the periodical revision is established by the 
firm; it is based on the complexity and the relevant factors of each product. 
Then the manufacturer should identify, in a preventing manner, all the events that could 
affect potential risks to investor and the expected return of the instrument; the most relevant 
are: 
 
 if some parameters cross a threshold that indicate changing in the expected return of the 
product, 
 the solvency of certain issuers whose securities may affect the performance of financial 
instrument233. 
 
If such events happen, the new regime requires that the manufacturer implement a plan to 
stem the impact of the negative event or solve the problem in a proportionate and appropriate 
manner. The Regulator, through the launch of Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593 of 7 April 
2016, has provided a series of measures and actions that investment firms should follow in 
these negative occurrences: 
 
 the investment firm should communicate to the client (or to the distributor if we are 
considering a manufacturer firm) the information about a specific event and the 
consequences that this event could have in the financial instrument’s performance; 
 in some cases, the investment firm should change the product approval process; 
 it should change the financial product to avoid the resell of unfair contract; 
 it could stop the intended following issuance of that specific instrument; 
 the investment firm must revise and assess the distribution strategy; it could sometimes 
happen that the chosen distribution strategy, and the consequent distribution channels, 
are not appropriate for a precise financial product. For example, it could happen that a 
financial product that was created for an elite group of clients, it has been sold later to a 
large group of investors. In this case it is necessary a cooperation with the distributor in 
order to identify a more appropriate distribution process. 
                                                          
233 Art. 9 (15) of Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593 of 7 April 2016. 
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 In an extreme case, it could be necessary to end the relationship with the distributor and 
hence evaluate other possible candidates that can cover the role of distributor; 
 it can be useful to communicate the problems to the competent authorities234; this event 
is strictly linked with the product intervention regime. The direct relationship between 
product governance and product intervention will be analysed later. 
 
In order to comply with these obligations is necessary a strict relationship and cooperation 
between distributor and manufacturer. In fact, the manufacturer should receive periodically 
the right stream of information from the distributor235.  
The Regulator, after a series of proposals, critiques and resistances from some financial 
players, has established that the reporting duties, more precisely all the information 
necessary for a correct assessment of the consistency of a product in relation to the needs, 
characteristics and objectives of the clients, is a fundamental pillar for the correct functioning 
of product governance obligations. 
The relevant information in this context regards the data about clients, the sales out of the 
target market and the objections from clients236. 
In the context of monitoring obligations, also the distributor is subject to these obligations 
and has a certain responsibility. It is obliged to review periodically the product governance 
rules in order to assure that they continue to meet the initial purposes; if there are some 
deviations from the original aims, it must take in place actions and measures for the purpose 
of achieving again the objectives237. 
In addition to this, the distributor must carry out a periodical assessment of the products 
offered or recommended and checks if they remain consistent in relation to the needs, 
characteristics and objectives of the clients, as well as the appropriateness of the distribution 
strategy. 
In the case of the distributor ascertains that it has wrongly identified the target market for a 
precise product or that the product considered no longer meets the needs and objectives of 
the target market it must update or modify the product governance arrangements238.  
Hence, manufacturer and distributor have to be revised periodically products and services 
provided for the purpose of assessing the compatibility with the identified target market. 
                                                          
234 For a detailed analysis of National Competent Authorities see ESMA List of competent authorities to carry out 
the duties provided for by the Directive 2014/65/EU on Markets in Financial Instruments (MiFID II) as required 
by Article 67 (3) of MiFID II of 3 January 2018. 
235 Art. 10 (9) of Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593 of 7 April 2016. 
236 Recital 20 of Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593 of 7 April 2016. 
237 Art. 10 (4) of Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593 of 7 April 2016. 
238 Art. 10 (5) of Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593 of 7 April 2016. 
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This monitoring procedure requires a prefect cooperation between manufacturer and 
distributor because, on one hand the manufacturer has to consider the amount of 
information needed and how to get it, on the other side, the distributor, to support the task 
of the manufacturer, should provide all the relevant data linked with the product. 
The relationship between manufacturer and distributor has been tightened and now require 
a more accurate supervision and cooperation; this is fundamental for an efficient exchange 
of information and a higher degree of transparency that allow, at the end of the cycle, an 
improvement of the investor protection239. 
 
 The responsibility of management body for product governance arrangements 
The product governance regime and the correlated processes have to be controlled regularly; 
the management body is responsible for this type of assessment. The product governance, 
which is as important as it is complex, requires to the compliance function an accurate 
monitoring of the development of the arrangements; this is useful to avoid any risk of failure 
by the investment firm to comply with the obligations240.  
Accordingly, a compliance report has to be delivered to the firm’s management body241 
periodically and must always include the trend and the data about the products manufactured 
and/or offered by the MiFID firm242. Furthermore, the investment firms have to present the 
report to their competent authorities on request. 
So, in this context, it addressed to the compliance function243 a central role in the supervision 
of the internal rule that discipline the product governance process. Hence, the management 
body is entitled to define, approve and supervise the policy of the investment firm in relation 
to products, operations and activities in accordance with the risk tolerance of the firm and 
the needs and characteristics of the end clients to whom the products are offered. The rules 
concerning product governance are extended to all players involved in the path that regards 
a financial instrument. 
Therefore, all the staff involved in the process of the creation of the product has to possess 
the right skills and competencies244 to comprehend the features and risks of products that are 
intended to be manufactured. 
                                                          
239 Newnham M., “The state of play of MiFID II on fund distribution”, in Journal of Securities Operations & 
Custody, Volume 10, Number 2, pp. 117-124(8), 1 March 2018. 
240 Art. 9 (7) of Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593 of 7 April 2016. 
241 Art. 9 of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 
242 Art. 9 (6) of Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593 of 7 April 2016. 
243 Final Report – ESMA’s Technical Advice to the Commission on MiFID II and MiFIR, 19 December 2014. 
244 Final Report – ESMA’s Technical Advice to the Commission on MiFID II and MiFIR, p. 56 (no. 6), 19 
December 2014. 
 
 
74 
 
Always in the context of responsibility, not directly linked with the management body, but 
however worthy of note, is the final responsibility in a chain of investment firms. ESMA 
Technical Advice states that when different firms work together in the distribution phase, 
the last firm in the chain, namely the firm that has a direct contact with the client has the 
duty to guarantee the application of product governance obligations. The intermediate 
distributor in turn has the duty to facilitate the exchange information between the 
manufacturer and the final distributor even if, in any case, it must respect the product 
governance obligations245.  
 
Timing and Grandfathering 
The product governance regime, like the major provisions of MiFID II, has entered into force 
from 3 January 2018. 
There are no direct grandfathering provisions under the new legislative package.  
However, ESMA has communicated that manufacturer and distributor, and so the financial 
instruments produced and distributed before the entry date, 3 January 2018, are not subject to 
product governance rules246. 
Conversely, the products that are manufactured before that entry date, but which are distributed 
to investors after 3 January 2018, would fall under the product governance regime for 
distributors, in particular under the obligation concerning the identification of the target market.  
In this precise situation, the distributor should apply the provisions regarding the relationship 
between a MiFID distributor firm with a non-MiFID manufacturer firm, namely in a deeper and 
accurate manner. In the case where the manufacturer has already provided a potential target 
market, the distributor, after a precise review, could decide to maintain the target of client 
identified by the manufacturer247. 
 
Product Governance Obligations for Investment Firm Operating in Wholesale 
Market 
The obligations set out in the Art. 16 (3) and in Art. 24 (2) are referred to all the possible clients, 
i.e eligible, professional and retail. At the same time these provisions are addressed to end 
clients. So, if we consider a chain of firms involved in the production process of financial 
instruments, should be presented a model formed by a series of connections between many 
                                                          
245 See p. 61, Technical Advice n. 31 of Final Report – ESMA’s Technical Advice to the Commission on MiFID 
II and MiFIR, 19 December 2014. 
246 Par. 64 of ESMA Guidelines on MiFID II product governance requirements, 5 February 2018. 
247 Par. 65 of ESMA Guidelines on MiFID II product governance requirements, 5 February 2018. 
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investment firms before the stage in which is implemented the relationship with the end client. 
In this context, an investment firm, that represents a unit of the entire chain, is not obliged to 
indicate the reference of target market within the intermediary chain, that means it is not subject 
to the burden to indicate the target market for other firms within the intermediary chain248. 
Conversely, it must identify the target market of end clients, namely the final client in the chain. 
In fact, the investment firm that covers a role of manufacturer or distributor cannot be 
considered as a final client. However, for this reason, if the firm in the chain acts as 
manufacturer (remodelling and modifying the products) or as distributor (delivering the product 
to the end client), it should respect the product governance rules respectively for manufacturer 
and distributor.  
In the context in which there are only professional and eligible counterparties, we can talk about 
the wholesale market. This environment assumes a certain degree of knowledge and experience 
that in turn affect the capacity for comprehension of risks. 
Taking into consideration a professional end client, the firm can assume that this type of client 
is able to understand the risks connected to the financial instrument; furthermore, within this 
category it is necessary to make a distinction in two subsets, namely “per se” professional client 
and professional client “on request”249. In this latter distinction, the investment firm must 
consider that the professional client on request generally has a lower degree of knowledge than 
the per se professional client. 
With regard to the eligible counterparty, although it covers the highest tier in the hierarchical 
pyramid of knowledge and, at the same time the lowest tier in term of protection, the MiFID II 
regime attempts to improve the level of protection also for this category.  
Nevertheless, a firm, in a trade relationship with an eligible counterparty as end client, is not 
obliged to respect the provisions in Art. 24 of MiFID II except for the points 4250 and 5251; it 
must anyway conduct the operation in a correct, clear and not misleading manner and following 
the provisions in Art.16252. 
Even in this context, MiFID II attempts to improve the investor protection as a whole, 
notwithstanding, having more attention for the retail client 253 , which is historically been 
considered the weakest financial player. 
                                                          
248 Par. 75 of ESMA Guidelines on MiFID II product governance requirements, 5 February 2018. 
249 Par. 81 of ESMA Guidelines on MiFID II product governance requirements, 5 February 2018. 
250 Appropriate information shall be provided to the client in a good time, for a deep analysis see Art. 24, Par. 4 of 
Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 
251 Information should be provided in a comprehensible manner, for a deep analysis see Art. 24, Par. 5 of Directive 
2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014  
252 Art. 16 (3) of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 
253 Moloney N., “The investor model underlying the EU’s investor protection regime: consumer or investors?”, in 
European Business Organization Law Review, Vol. 13, Issue 2, pp. 169-193, 28 June 2012. 
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3.3  Complex and Structured Products 
The investment firm, in the selling practice concerning complex254 and structured products, has 
to be in compliance with more stringent obligations. In general, these types of products require 
a high degree of attention255 due to the complex structure and the correlated difficulty in the 
comprehension of risks and expected rewards. 
ESMA, through an Opinion, highlights the need to adopt specific and stronger organisational 
provisions, as well as a more develop internal control in order to ensure the respect of the 
client’s interest in the distribution phase. 
The complexity of a product is often translated in a lack of information; in fact, if the 
intermediary claims that a complex product will rarely satisfy the needs of a client or that the 
product, due to its intrinsic features, is difficult to be assessed because of the opaqueness of the 
available information, it shouldn’t be sold. NCAs have the task of monitoring the actions 
conducted by the intermediary256 for the purpose of avoiding miss-selling practices. 
ESMA has provided a list of complex products which includes an explanation of all the features 
that can characterized a complex financial product257. Even CONSOB has defined a series of 
features and systematic elements that can affect financial products including them in the 
category of complex products; therefore, it also highlights an important consideration that it is 
often disregarded: the riskiness and the complexity of a product are not always linked with a 
directly proportional function; in fact, in the financial system have been created complex 
products with a low risky-level and vice versa. However, in general the complex products258 
are normally characterized by difficult comprehensibility, opaqueness and high riskiness. 
ESMA and CONSOB have delineated some elements that are usually included in complex 
products: 
 
 The presence of derivatives 
 The presence of underlying instrument difficult to evaluate 
 The use of opaque indices 
 Problems of liquidity 
                                                          
254 Through the analysis of the Art. 25, Par 4 of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council 
of 15 May 2014 it can be identified the group of financial instruments that can be considered as complex products. 
255 Di Nella L., “Features of the New Financial Markets Law (MIFID 2 AND MIFIR)”, in Revista Brasileira 
Direito Civil 119, pp. 141-143, 2018. 
256 Opinion on MiFID practices for firms selling complex products, ESMA 2014/146 of 7 February 2014. 
257 Point 10 of Opinion on MiFID practices for firms selling complex products, ESMA 2014/146 of 7 February 
2014. 
258 Lener R., Lucantoni P., “Regole di condotta nella negoziazione degli strumenti finanziari complessi: disclosure 
in merito agli elementi strutturali o sterilizzazione, sul piano funzionale, del rischio come elemento tipologico e/o 
normativo”, In Banca Borsa Titoli di Credito. Fasc. 4, p.369, 2012. 
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 Exit barriers  
 Payoff structure involving multiple variables and complex mathematical formulas. 
 
Then CONSOB has provided a list, known as “Black list”, in order to indicate some complex 
financial products that the intermediary should not sell to retail client for the purpose 
maintaining a high level of protection259. 
In any case, the intermediary is always obliged to carry out a deep due diligence in relation to 
the complex financial products included in its product catalogue260. 
In particular, the structured retail products (SRP)261 are difficult to understand by retail clients; 
they are not able to assess adequately the drivers of risks and returns of structured products. For 
these reasons mainly, the retail client can incur in heavy losses that in turn can lead to a decrease 
of confidence in regulatory framework or financial markets and can threat the reputation of 
manufacturers and distributors. 
ESMA has defined product governance rules with a huge importance and as a fundamental 
pillar for the investor protection. Hence, the soundness of this regime must be assured mainly 
in the context of complex products in order to limit the intervention of the competent authorities. 
In this framework the product governance must be followed in a very precise and deep manner 
and, both manufacturer and distributor of SRP should regularly assess each stage from the 
manufacturing and distribution to the post-selling monitoring phase.  
Following the ESMA’s Opinion, the steps are very similar to those of the classical product 
governance regime; in fact, the main stages are262: 
 
 general organisation arrangements in which are defined the steps before the 
manufacturing and distribution phases, the role and responsibility of internal players, 
the review regime and the flows of information necessary among distributor and 
manufacturer; 
 product design in which are considered the needs, characteristics, interests and 
objectives of potential clients; 
 product testing in which are assessed potential risks of the product and in which are 
tested the possible performances; 
                                                          
259 CONSOB Communication n. 0097996 of 22 December 2014. 
260 Di Nella L., “Le regole comportamentali nella distribuzione di prodotti finanziari complessi”, in “La MiFID 
II, rapporti con la clientela, regole di governance, mercati”, pp. 113-165, a cura di Troiano V., Motroni R. 
261 Structured Retail Product (SRP) is a financial product composed by a base instrument such as a note fund or 
deposit with embedded derivatives that provides economic exposure to reference asset, portfolios or indexes. 
262  Opinion on Structured Retail Products – Goods practices for product governance arrangements, ESMA 
2014/332 of 27 March 2014. 
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 the identification of target market concerns the identification and the analysis of possible 
end clients for each SRP; it’s very similar to the aforementioned classical product 
governance regime; 
 the distribution strategy in which are defined the methods to identify the right 
distributor/distribution strategy, the role and the responsibility of the different players. 
Even in this context, the flow of information between manufacturer and distributor is 
relevant in order to act in accordance with the product governance rules; 
 assessment of the value at the date of issuance and transparency costs: through this 
process the manufacturer or distributor have to communicate the value of the instrument 
in accordance with the models and methodologies used in the product design and 
product testing phases; 
 information about the secondary market: in this phase the investment firm should 
provide all the information to end client concerning the trading in secondary market; 
 the review process is useful to assess the product governance arrangements for the 
purpose of ameliorating the previous stages and the performance of the SRP. 
 
The sale of complex products represents, since the crisis period, an important source for 
investment firms but at the same time a dangerous threat for the investor; in particular, for the 
retail class of investors that doesn’t have the right competencies to understand the relevant 
features of these type of financial instruments 263 . Hence, in this field, it is necessary an 
increasingly detailed and efficient model of regulation that can assist both clients and 
investment firms264. 
 
  
                                                          
263 Musile Tanzi P., “Come cambia la governance dei prodotti finanziari complessi”, in Strumenti finanziari e 
Fiscalità, 10 Luglio 2015. 
264 Avgouleas E., “Regulating financial innovation. A multifaceted challenge to financial stability, consumer 
protection, and growth”, in Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation, Oxford University Press, 2014. 
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3.4 The Interconnection between Product Governance and Product 
Intervention 
The global financial crisis has highlighted many flaws in the old legislative framework and, 
among other things, one of the main hole is represented by the failure of the market directly 
linked with the role of the Regulator265. 
Since 2010, the European Union has created a supervisory system called the European System 
of Financial Supervision (ESFS). The system is composed by the European Supervisory 
Authorities266 (ESAs), the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), the Joint Committee of the 
European Supervisory Authorities, and the national supervisory authorities of EU member 
states. They are responsible for the assessment of the correct functioning of the system and for 
the periodical monitoring function. In fact, as reported in MiFIR regulation, the competent 
authorities have to monitor financial products and structured deposits 267  that are created, 
marketed, distributed and sold in their state or from their state268. 
The old directive was not able to correct completely the problem of asymmetric information 
and mis-selling and the resulting negative impact on financial market due to the misleading 
selling of toxic and opaque products. 
Initially, in this way, the new legislative package aims at improving the investor protection and 
confidence in the financial system; introducing the product governance rules, as a means to 
control and prevent cases of mis-selling, the Regulator has imposed a rigid framework in the 
phases of creation, designing, marketing, distribution and selling of financial products. The 
product intervention instead, considered by many scholars the natural legislative complement 
of product governance, was introduced in order to limit or denied the diffusion of dangerous 
product to the single investor and to guarantee the integrity of the whole financial system. 
Hence, MiFID II and MiFIR, with the implementation of product intervention, has mandated 
the national and supranational authorities to control and intervene, both in a preventive manner 
and during the process, in the creation, marketing, distribution and selling of products of the 
Union. 
                                                          
265 Franza E., “La “product intervention” del mondo MiFID II/MiFIR”, in Rivista di Diritto Bancario, Dicembre 
2017. 
266 The European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) is composed by The European Banking Authority (EBA) in 
London, The European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA) in Paris and The European Insurance and 
Occupational Pension Authority (EIOPA) in Frankfurt. 
267 Lorenzi P., “La disciplina dei depositi strutturati: dalla MiFID 2 alla bozza di consultazione del Regolamento 
Intermediari”, in Rivista di Diritto Bancario, Ottobre 2017. 
268 Art. 39, Ch. 1, Title VII of Regulation (EU) No. 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
May 2014. 
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National authorities should intervene269 , prohibiting or limiting270 some financial instruments, 
when they can affect negatively the investor protection, the correct functioning and the integrity 
of the financial market or commodity market or when a derivative instrument has a negative 
influence in the pricing procedure of the underlying market. 
In this way, the Regulator, introducing an actual intervention power in favour of the authorities; 
it has wished to complete the product governance regime believing that the product intervention 
regime could make sure the effectiveness of the product governance rules. 
It is possible to talk about the product intervention like a complementary tool of the product 
governance regime because the intervention powers in the hands of authorities should be used 
as a means of “last resort” in the extreme case in which all the other possible actions are not 
available or wouldn’t produce a successfully result. In particular, the intervention power should 
be activated only when there is an evident failure of the product governance regime. 
However, the Regulator enables, in extreme cases, the intervention by the authorities, as a 
precautionary measure, before the marketing, distribution or sale of products to end client271. 
Obviously, in order to ensure a correct functioning of both process of product governance and 
product intervention, it must be implemented a perfect cooperation between the authorities. 
MiFIR has imposed some rules in the monitoring practices that must affect and regulate the 
relationship between national and supranational authorities.  
In brief, National Competent Authorities before the implementation of any actions must inform 
ESAs that in turn must communicate an opinion related with the proposal of NCA; however, 
the opinion of ESA is not binding but in the case of the NCA decide to operate anyway, it has 
to justify the choice accurately. 
The action implemented by ESA predominate the action of NCA and maintain the effect for 
three months, after that the action can be renewed, otherwise it expires and loses any effect. 
The powers of the national and supranational authorities can be summarized in: 
 NCAs’ actions: 
1. are not subject to a periodic review; 
2. are not subject to final term; 
3. must be revoked only if the grounding facts no longer exist. 
 
 ESAs’ actions: 
                                                          
269 Art. 40 (1) of Regulation (EU) No. 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014. 
270 Art. 9 (5) of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 
2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority). 
271 Recital 29 of Regulation (EU) No. 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014. 
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1. must be reviewed every three months; 
2. are subject to final term; 
3. have temporary effects. 
For a deeper analysis of the criteria that must be taken into account when authorities want to 
implement measures and actions, the European Commission has issued a Delegated 
Regulation 272 containing some details about the criteria that must be followed in order to 
implement the intervention power. 
In general, the intervention measures can be classified in four categories273: 
 
 the possibility to ban the sale of certain product to retail investor; 
 the possibility to ban specific features of some products; 
 the possibility to ban the marketing of specific product to certain class of client; 
 provide additional information for certain products 
 
After the analysis of the new product governance rules and product intervention regime, it is 
possible to assert that these two sections of the MiFID II package must be analysed in 
conjunction. 
The last financial crisis has highlighted the massive asymmetric information among market 
players. This automatically led to a remarkable lack of transparency in the market and a 
decreasing in the investor protection 274 . These legislative holes in turn has brought the 
investors, in particular the retail class, to invest in financial products that later showed high 
incompatibility in relation to the needs, characteristics and objectives of some types of 
clients275. The efforts implemented by the Regulator to revise the old legal framework, in order 
to solve the flaws that emerged during the financial crisis, were realised through the 
introduction of an ex-ante regime, namely product governance and an ex-post action, namely 
product intervention.  
These regimes should avoid the selling of harmful and complex products to investors that are 
not able to manage them.  
                                                          
272  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/567 of 18 May 2016 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 
600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to definitions, transparency, portfolio 
compression and supervisory measures on product intervention and positions. 
273 For a deeper analysis see SMSG Advice to ESMA, “Own initiative report on product intervention under 
MiFIR”, 16 June 2017. 
274 Busch D., “MiFID II and MiFIR: stricter rules for the EU financial markets”, in Law and Financial Markets 
Review Journal, Vol. 11, Issue 2-3, pp. 126-142, 2017. 
275 Carotenuto G., “Product intervention under MiFID II/MiFIR”, in Rivista di Diritto Bancario, Settembre 2017. 
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In this way, they could avoid many cases of mis-selling that were widespread in the period 
before the crisis; in fact, a lot of financial instruments were sold mainly respecting the own 
interest of the investment firms rather than the best interest of client. 
 
 
3.5  How Product Governance Affects Investor Protection: The Mis-selling 
Problem 
Traditionally, the main goal of the legal framework in the economic environment is the 
protection of the retail client against the flaws and imperfections of the market276, that generally 
represents the weakest and the lowest informed individual. The Regulator, with the 
implementation of product governance regime, has attempted, inter alia, to stem the damages 
and the hazards originating by the misleading behaviour of intermediaries. These market 
players, that cover a central role in the product governance, exploiting the gap in knowledge, 
experience and skills in relation to those of client, have often acted in their own interest rather 
than in the best interest of client. 
This misleading behaviour has led to problems both in the relationship between intermediary 
and client (retail conduct failure) and in the correct functioning and integrity of the financial 
system (market conduct failure). 
In many cases, the investor protection ruleset, mainly in the old legislative framework, was 
based on the suitability and appropriateness procedures but these measures have led to mis-
selling practices anyway. Some limits of these measures have emerged recently because these 
tests are taken in place only at the end of the life-cycle of the product. 
Regulator, due to these poor results, has decide to implement he product governance and 
product intervention regime with the aim to stem, among others, the risk of mis-selling. 
EBA has reported in the joint position a series of the most relevant cases of mis-selling in 
Europe; for the sake of explanation, it will be presented a bullet list subdivided according to the 
classification among Member States277: 
 
                                                          
276 Pacces A. M, Heremans D., “Regulation of banking and financial markets”, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 
AND ECONOMICS: REGULATION AND ECONOMICS, 2nd Edition, a cura di A.M. Pacces and R.J. Van den 
Bergh, eds., Elgar, 2012. 
277 Joint Position of the European Supervisory Authorities on Manufacturers’ Product Oversight and Governance 
Processes, JC-2013-77. 
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 UK case 278: in a period in which the traditional securities sector was instable and 
volatile, many investors has decided to purchase alternative products that, due to their 
intrinsic features, are not able to meet the needs of that investors and had a high 
probability to fail. Other than this, there was a huge amount of mis-selling of Payment 
Protection Insurance (PPI)279 products by some of the largest banks in UK280. 
 Denmark case: in Denmark were sold very complex structured products to retail 
investors that didn’t have the right competence and experiences to understand the 
product as well as a high degree of risk aversion; these clients’ characteristics didn’t 
allow a perfect match with those instruments. 
 Belgium and Finland cases: the high complexity of some products prevented the 
possibility by investors to understand the features of products and in this way led to poor 
and wrong investment decision. 
 Spain case: Spanish banks has sold to retail investors hybrid financial products; they 
didn’t explain accurately all the information and risks regarding these types of 
instruments. Then, Spain presented problems related to the bad presentation of the risk 
of structured products; many complex products were sold to a client class that are not 
compatible with them. Estonia have experienced similar problems. 
 Italy case: in Italy during the period of crisis were sold many complex products to retail 
investors. 
 France and Netherland cases: in these states there was a problem in the selling practice 
of insurance products; they were characterized by high and opaque cost structure. 
 Latvia case: in Latvia were sold PRIIPs that were not regulated by any legislative 
framework and obligations. 
 
In order to stem these phenomenon that signed in a remarkable manner the investor protection 
and the investor confidence in the financial system, the Regulator has introduced an harmonize 
legislation for the purpose of recovering the investor confidence and solve the problems caused 
by the fragmentary supervision power in favour of common practices for all Member States. 
In this way, as regards the banking and insurance sector, the focus of the attention is switched 
from an informative perspective to a perspective based on the intermediaries’ obligations 
                                                          
278  Zepeda R., “Derivatives mis-selling by British banks and the failed legacy of the FSA”, in Journal of 
International Banking Law and Regulation, 2013. 
279 Payment Protection Insurance (PPI) is an insurance product that allow a consumer to ensure the repayment of 
credit against some borrower problems. 
280 Connell P., Blacker K., “Systemic operationl risk: the UK payment protection insurance scandal”, in The 
Journal of Operational Risk, Vol. 7, Number 1, pp. 79-139, Spring 2012. 
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(strictly linked with product governance) and supervision powers useful as efficient tools to 
recover the confidence of investor and improve the level of protection281. 
The relationship between intermediaries and clients is fundamental in the investment process; 
the presence of events in which intermediary adopt a misleading behaviour exploiting the 
phenomenon of asymmetric information it is a recurrent theme; for example, a common practice 
consist in to deceiving the investors about risks and costs of a specific financial instrument. 
Even if all the relevant information is disclosed, it often happens that due to the lack of skills 
and competencies of some client classes, the information is not understood in the correct 
manner282. 
 
 
3.6  Non-MiFID Firms and the Problem of Information-Gathering Process 
The product governance rules, implemented through the introduction of the new legislative 
package, have affected all the investment firms located in the European Economic Area that for 
this reason are subject to the new rulebook. They are mainly influenced in the manufacturing 
and distribution processes of financial products. 
Although, the product governance regime is applied to MiFID firms, it indirectly affects also 
non-MiFID firms when these firms have a business relationship with MiFID firms and when 
they distribute financial products that are produced by manufacturer MiFID firms. 
The relationship between MiFID and non-MiFID firms is very common; nowadays, due to the 
technology improvement, the advanced tools of communication and the transportation routes 
are gradually getting more efficient, it is very easy to implement a global business network 
among firms located in different European countries or even in different continents. 
In the case of a non-MiFID firm has an affiliate MiFID firm as a means through which 
distributes financial products within the European Economic Area, are applied in any case the 
product governance rules. In a more detailed manner, a firm that distributes financial 
instruments that are manufactured by a firm that is not subject to product governance 
requirements, it must carry out a rigorous analysis and an accurate due diligence in order to 
provide the right level of protection in comparison to a situation where the product had been 
manufactured in respect of product governance obligations283. 
                                                          
281 Sciarrone Alibrandi A., “Dalla tutela informativa alla product governance: nuove strategie regolatorie dei 
rapporti tra clientela e intermediari finanziari”, in Rivista della Regolazione dei mercati, Fascicolo 1, 2016. 
282 Sane R., Halan M., “Misled and mis-sold: financial misbehaviour in retail banks?”, in Journal of Comparative 
Economics 45, pp. 429-444, 2017. 
283 Par. 60 of ESMA Guidelines on MiFID II product governance requirements, 5 February 2018. 
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Hence, following this latter case, if a product is designed and created by a firm that not fall 
under the product governance obligations, the distributor must in any case applies the product 
governance rules in a more prudence way because it represents the only guarantor of the 
application of  product governance as a tool to protect end investors; these types of relationship 
with a non-MiFID firms could affect the classical information gathering process and the target 
market identification procedure: 
 
 Information gathering process: the distributor has the duty to verify and check all the 
information received from manufacturer not subject to Directive 2014/65/EU (product 
governance requirements in particular) in order to ensure that the financial products are 
distributed to clients (the target market) in respect of the needs, characteristics and 
objectives.  
In some cases, the information necessary for the distributor are not publicly available; 
in this situation, the distributor must implement a strategy in order to gather the 
information useful to complete the process. The most common strategy is to enter into 
an agreement with the manufacturer for the purpose of obtaining all relevant information 
to make a precise identification of the target market284.  
The distributor can accept and use the information publicly available only if they are 
clear, trustworthy and produced in compliance with some regulatory and information 
requirements like Directive 2003/71/EC285 or “transparency” Directive 2004/109/EC286 
that are amended by the more recent and precise Directive 2013/50/EU287. In general, 
the most common source of information is the KID. 
 Target market identification: distributor has to identify the actual target market 
following the classical aforementioned guidelines even in the case that the manufacturer 
has not previously identified the potential target market288. The distributor has to define 
                                                          
284 Art. 10 (2) of Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593 of 7 April 2016. 
285 Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the prospectus 
to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and amending Directive 
2001/34/EC.  
286 Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of 
transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a 
regulated market and amending Directive 2001/34/EC. 
287 Directive 2013/50/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 amending Directive 
2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of transparency requirements 
in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market, Directive 
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offered to the public or admitted to trading and Commission Directive 2007/14/EC laying down detailed rules for 
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its own actual target market even when it didn’t receive the right description or 
information about the approval process289. 
 
The whole burden of assessment, check and reliability of the information received from a non-
MiFID firm have come to be held by the distributor. 
The obligations of the distributor in the information gathering process and target market 
identification must be respected in a proportionate manner with respect to the complexity of the 
product involved and for products sold in the primary or secondary market.  
The stream of information between market players covers a central role in the financial 
environment and it is stressed in the new legislative package290. As the flows of information 
between the intermediary and end client are fundamental for a sound relationship, also those 
implemented in the previous steps are necessary in order to allow for a correct functioning as a 
whole. 
In fact ESMA has asserted that a firm, representing in the context the last player in the business 
chain before the end client, if it covers a position in which it can’t receive the right amount of 
information by a manufacturer that is not subject to product governance regime and, as a 
consequence of this, it is not able to respect the rules of MiFID II, the distributor shouldn’t offer 
these types of products to end clients291. 
Hence, the relationship implemented by firms in a business chain covers a fundamental 
mechanism in the whole process. More accurate is the flow of information exchanged, more 
tailor-made and precise will be the products in relation to the end clients’ needs, characteristics 
and objectives. 
In a general economic environment, the chain of firms becomes a unique and single operator; 
in this view, the competition among market players is not anymore based on the competition 
between the single firms but become a competition between groups of firms. So, the exchange 
of information inside the chain can grant an improvement in the competitiveness.  
Again, in this context, as I have said before, the manufacturer, the first unit in the chain, has the 
duty to choose the right distributor in order to reach the end client in the best manner and for 
the purpose of delivering a product that meets the features of clients. 
Conversely, the firms didn’t always have the convenience to deliver all the information. Some 
of these data can be considered as private information and probably is not diffused in the right 
manner to another unit in the chain. In this way, in order to defend information that is retained 
                                                          
289 Par. 61 of ESMA Guidelines on MiFID II product governance requirements, 5 February 2018. 
290 Annunziata F., “Le nuove sfide della MiFID II”, in Rivista di Diritto Bancario, Marzo 2018. 
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as private, there will be a problem that will harm the end client. In fact, as I have reported 
before, in order to grant a perfect match between the financial product and the target market at 
the end of the chain, it is necessary a perfect exchange of information between manufacturer 
and distributor.  
It’s probable, in some cases, that the firms involved in the process, in order to defend some 
private information, don’t deliver the right stream of information damaging the main goal of 
the product governance regime, namely improve the investor protection ensuring tailor-made 
products. 
This delicate problem of privacy could be an infinite hole in the regulation; on one side the 
investment firm, by definition, has to produce profit for the right functioning of business 
system; on the other side, product governance requires to investment firm to act in the best 
interest of client. 
After this digression in the delicate privacy system, it prompts the question as to what the end 
aim of investment firm is.  
In a relationship between non-MiFID and MiFID firms, the problem is more stressed because 
the MiFID firm has to gather the maximum amount of information in order to apply the product 
governance regime and this is probably more difficult with respect to the collection of 
information from a MiFID firm. 
A perfect exchange of information is possible maybe in a utopian model of financial system.  
The product governance regime requires a perfect and precise exchange of information between 
manufacturer and distributor in order to meet the specific features of the end client.  
In my opinion, this is impossible because even if we consider the business chain as a unique 
player, actually it is composed by different single firms that must defend their own interests and 
produce profit, that by definition is the main goal of any firm. In this context, the effort of 
product governance in the field of investor protection is evident but there is no a certain 
guarantee of the perfect investor protection. I have also talked about the product intervention, 
that should intervene in case of investment firms sell or could sell a dangerous financial product 
to the end client; also in this case the power of the product intervention is limited; for example, 
although a specific product is approved, because it has passed the inspection and the assessment 
imposed by the new legislative package, there is not the certainty that this product was designed, 
created, marketed and sold following the best approach. There will be always a manoeuvre 
margin carried out by the investment firms on which they can operate respecting the rules but 
not reaching always the maximum degree of “act in the best interest of client”. 
Similar events can occur, for example, when there is not a perfect exchange of information 
between the parties involved in the manufacturing and distribution process. This means that, 
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even if the obligations are met, there is no certainty that investment firms have acted in the best 
possible way. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this dissertation I have tried to analyse the new Market in Financial Instrument Directive 
(MiFID II) starting with a brief explanation of the old directive and in particular considering 
the principal flaws and shortcomings highlighted through the financial crisis. These weaknesses 
of the old legislative framework represent the starting point for the restructuring of the old 
directive towards a more complete and regulated legislative package. Hence, the Regulator, 
after the global financial crisis, has attempted to solve any type of legal hole through the 
restyling of some provisions and the introduction of new tools. 
The well-known MiFID II is originated by a series of different directives and regulations that 
must be considered together in order to have a complete view of the new legislative package. 
As reported in the old directive, the main fields of interest around which the new legislative 
package was implemented are very similar with respect to the old framework. The investor 
protection remains one of the most important pillar in MiFID II together with the information 
regime and market transparency rules. The global financial crisis had highlighted the 
shortcomings in the previous legislative framework and many rigorous measures and actions 
were necessary in order to restore the investor confidence and guarantee a correct functioning 
of financial system with sound and solid basis. 
In particular, to reach these type of objectives, the Regulator has implemented some innovative 
measures, many of which have amended some rules of the old directive, as well as other 
important innovative tools and regimes; the most relevant concerns product governance regime 
and product intervention powers. 
The new framework presents a high degree of dependence among rules and it often happens 
that some of them must be applied in accordance with others; even the main goals of the 
Regulator are strictly linked. In fact, for example, in order to reach a high level of investor 
protection is necessary a solid transparency regime and a continuous and precise exchange of 
information among market players; this means that the provisions are dependent on each other 
and the application of one particular rule, for example, implies the correct implementation of 
another provision. 
Coming back to the product governance and product intervention regime, in this dissertation I 
have focused the attention on the former one analysing in detail each component and procedure 
that compose the process, from the initial engineering and product design phases to the post-
selling and monitoring phases. Within this complex process are indirectly included a relevant 
number of provisions and rules that normally are applied separately in different legal contexts 
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like rules about information flow and transparency. In some way it seems that product 
governance regime embeds a huge number of provisions implemented in MiFID II. These types 
of provisions, even if are indirectly applied, cover a fundamental and central role for the end 
goal of product governance. 
Product governance, that was created with the end aim to guarantee to end clients a quasi-tailor-
made financial product in relation to their needs, features and characteristics, is the tool through 
which the Regulator has attempted to reach a twofold objective, namely the improvement of 
the investor protection and the correlated correct functioning of the whole financial market. If 
we consider the product governance as a starting point of this objective, at the origin of this 
path it is necessary an efficient information flow among the players involved. 
Hence, as I have said previously, not only the entire MiFID II must be analysed in a wide 
approach but also the product governance regime must be implemented and read through a 
broad legislative analysis and taken into consideration a disparate number of provisions. 
For a perfect functioning of product governance process is necessary a perfect exchange of 
information between manufacturers and distributors but the stream of information can be 
hampered by privacy problems. 
Since product governance is a very recently innovation, introduced in January 2018, it is too 
early to judge the effective results of this new regime. Although the product governance will 
improve investor protection due to the introduction of a strict assessment of the procedure and 
the intervention power in the hands of authorities in case of failure of the process, I think that 
this new regime has some limits. The most important one regards the aforementioned problem 
of information exchanged by players. 
The problem of privacy can’t be underestimated because cover a central role in all exchange of 
information models. All the firms that compose the business chain, under the product 
governance regime, should exchange a stream of information as much as possible precise and 
exhaustive in order to comply with the obligations imposed by the Regulator. They should act 
in the best interest of client and create and deliver a perfect instrument in relation to the needs, 
characteristics and objectives of the target market but this requires a very high degree of 
cooperation that it can sometimes harm the own main goals of any single firm, namely to make 
profit. 
Hence, I think, the Regulator should implement a product governance regime basing on an 
incentive system that allow firms, in the same value chain, to disclose all the information needed 
for a creation and distribution of a product with a high matching-degree with the target market 
but at the same time ensuring the own goals of each firms. 
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This hypothetical system, that in this my personal opinion could be considered as a “modified” 
product governance regime, should provide a balanced model in order to grant to both the sides 
of economic environment, investment firms on one hand and end clients on the other, to obtain 
better results pursuing in any case they own goals. 
Focusing the attention on the side of investment firms, the Regulator should be able to ensure 
that a hypothetic maximum effort of the firms to design and distribute the product doesn’t lead 
to a loss of profit due to the disclosure of private information. Considering the other side of 
market instead, the Regulator should ensure a perfect match between the features of products 
manufactured with the needs of end clients under the product governance regime but in 
accordance with the privacy legal framework. 
This model is probably a “pipe dream” because it would require too rigid legal framework; in 
conclusion I think that, although product governance has improved and will improve even more 
the investor protection, it is probably never lead to a complete investor protection because, in 
my opinion, each investment firm, even in compliance with the obligations dictated by the 
Regulator, will always act in its own best interest rather than in the best interest of client. 
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